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Workers' Compensation
by H. Michael Bagley*

Daniel C. Kniffen**
and

John G. Blackmon, Jr.***

I.

LEGISLATIVE CHANGES

The year 1992 brought the most comprehensive workers' compensation
reform legislation in two decades. 1 Dramatic changes impact the amount
and duration of temporary total disability benefits, the definition of
change of condition, vocational rehabilitation services in noncatastrophic
cases, and the return of subrogation by employers against third party
tortfeasors, as well as many other changes in the workers' compensation
2
system, as detailed below.
A.

Rehabilitation & CatastrophicInjuries

Rehabilitation services to workers suffering injuries that are noncatastrophic are no longer mandatory.3 The parties may agree to rehabilitation, but this will require the agreement of all parties in noncatastrophic
*
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1. House Bill No. 1679 was the culmination of perhaps the most heated legislative debate ever on the issue of workers' compensation.
2. 1992 Ga. Laws 1942, 1963. All changes became effective July 1, 1992, and coincide
with extensive changes in Board Rules.
3. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200.1 (1992)..
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cases to participate, since it is no longer required by the Workers' Compensation Act (the "Act"). In catastrophic cases, an employer must either appoint a rehabilitation supplier or provide sufficient reasons that
rehabilitation is not necessary within forty-eight hours of an "employer's
acceptance of the injury as compensable or notification of a final determination of compensability, whichever occurs later."' Therefore, the time
periods will not run from the date of injury. Instead, this initial appointment/assessment period will run from the date an employer accepts the
claim through the proper form filings or the date of a final award on the
issue of compensability.' If the issue presented to the State Board of
Workers' Compensation (the "Board") is not compensability, but whether
a particular injury satisfies the definition of catastrophic, then an employer is provided a full fifteen days from the date of the award in which
to appoint a rehabilitation supplier.7 Thus, employers who accept a claim,
but question catastrophic qualification, have an additional two weeks after determination of qualification in which to appoint a rehabilitation
supplier. If an employer fails to select a supplier within the time period
allowed, the Board may appoint a supplier.'
The 1992 legislation broadened the definition of "catastrophic injury"
under the Act. Whether a particular injury satisfies the criteria for catastrophic will become a threshold question that impacts many rights and
obligations under the Act. Catastrophic injury will include the following:
(1) Spinal cord injury involving severe paralysis ... ; (2) Amputation of
an arm, a hand, a foot, or a leg involving the effective loss of use of that
appendage; (3) Severe brain or closed head injury as evidenced by: (A)
Severe sensory or motor disturbances; (B) Severe communication disturbances; (C) Severe complex integrated disturbances of cerebral function;
(D) Severe disturbances of consciousness; (E) Severe episodic neurological disorders; or (F) Other conditions at least as severe in nature as [the
designated conditions); . .. land) (6) Any other injury of a nature and
severity as has qualified or would qualify an employee to receive disability income benefits under Title II or supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act ...

4. Rule 200.1 of the Rules and Regulations of the State Board of Workers' Compensation provides that once a party agrees to participate in vocational rehabilitation, the agreement cannot be retracted; but this rule appears to exceed the specific, non-binding provision
of O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200.1. GA. BD. OF WORKERS COMPENSATION R. 200.1 (The Workers' Compensation Act is currently codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 34-9-1 to -38 (1992)).
5. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200.1(a) (1992).
6. Id.

7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. § 34-9-200.1(g). (The Social Security Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397e
(1988)). Title II, Old-Age Survivors Disability Insurance Benefits of the SSA is codified at
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Some changes will probably have only a subtle effect on defining catastrophic injuries. Spinal cord injuries satisfy the criteria only if they involve "severe paralysis of an arm, a leg, or the trunk."10 Amputations
need not be to more than one appendage any longer, as the Act formerly
required," but they must involve the "effective loss of use" of an arm,
hand, foot, or leg.'" Brain or closed head injuries must be evidenced in
one of five specific ways and must be "severe." '
The broadest definitional expansion of catastrophic injuries is in the
inclusion of claimants who meet the criteria of Title II or Title XVI of
the Social Security Act. Generally, the Social Security Act defines disability as the inability "to engage in any substantial gainful [employment or]
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or
can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
months."1 4 The physical and mental impairment must be of such severity
that an employee is "not only unable to do his previous work but cannot,
considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other
type of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.'''
Title XVI of the Social Security Act defines disability as the aged (over
sixty-five), blind as defined in the Act, or disabled as set forth above."
Note that any consideration of time limitations under the Social Security
Act vis-a-vis the definition of catastrophic under the Workers' Compensa17
tion Act is removed.'
B. Indemnity Benefits: Increases and 400- Week Cap
The maximum weekly compensation rate for temporary total disability
benefits shall be $250 for accidents occurring after July 1, 1992.18 With
respect to temporary partial disability benefits under section 34-9-262 of
the Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A."), the maximum allowable compensation rate has been increased from $150 to $175 per week
for accidents occurring after July 1, 1992.19 Maximum benefits to a sur-

42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (1988). Title XVI, Supplemental Security Income of the SSA is codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1381-1383(d) (West 1992).
10. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200.1(g)(1) (1992).
11. See 1989 Ga. Laws 579, 583.
12. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200.1(g)(2) (1992).

13. Id. § 34-9-200.1(g)(3).
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1988).
Id. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
Id. § 1382c(a)(1)(A).
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200.1(g)(6) (1992).
Id. § 34-9-261,
Id. § 34-9-262.
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viving spouse who is a sole dependent will increase from $65,000 to
$100,000.20
For accidents occurring after July 1, 1992, there are several new qualifications and limitations on benefits. Temporary total disability benefits in
noncatastrophic cases "shall be payable for a maximum period of 400
weeks from the date of injury."2 1 This is a time limitation, not a limitation on the number of weeks of disability benefits. In catastrophic cases,
-there is no 400-week limit and benefits will be paid until "the employee
undergoes a change in condition for the better. 2 2 The American Medical
Association guidelines shall be the only basis for permanent impairment
ratings.2
C.

The New Change of Condition

Traditionally, the threshold question in assessing the rights and obligations of an employer and employee to ongoing temporary disability benefits has been whether the employee continues to possess physical limitations related to the on-the-job injury.2 The inability to perform a
particular job in which the worker was engaged at the time of the injury
is not a determining factor. Historically, a determining factor has been
the worker's inability to find any work suitable to the worker's condition
as a result of the work-related injury and compatible with his or her
training and experience.2 Furthermore, the existence of a permanent impairment rating entitling an employee to permanent partial disability
benefits under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-26326 does not, ipso facto, foist the
employee into the category of those entitled to either the payment of
temporary disability benefits or the tender of suitable employment.
Rather, Georgia law provides that "[i]mpaired earning capacity is not one
involving a percentage of disability, but rather impairment that renders
claimant unable to return to his regular employment or 'to procure remunerative employment at a different occupation suitable to his impaired

20.

Id. § 34-9-265(d).

21.

Id.

§

34-9-261 (emphasis added).

22. Id.
23. Id. § 34-9-1(5) (No longer may permanency ratings be based upon recognized medical books or guides other than the AMA Guidelines.).
24.

See Hensel Phelps Constr. Co. v. Manigault, 167 Ga. App. 599, 307 S.E.2d 79 (1983).

25. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co. v. Giles, 177 Ga. App. 684, 340 S.E.2d
284 (1986).
26.

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-263 (1992).
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capacity.' If the impairment prevents that return then his disability is
total."
Under Georgia law, when an employee suffers an on-the-job injury, returns to gainful employment, and subsequently seeks the recommencement of temporary disability benefits, the burden of proof is on the employee to show a change in condition. 2 However, if an employee is
collecting temporary disability benefits for either temporary total disability or temporary partial disability, the burden of proof has traditionally
29
been upon the employer to justify the suspension of benefits.
One of the most significant legislative changes is the addition of a new
type of change in condition.3 0 This provision provides for a change in condition for better entitling the employee to only temporary partial disability benefits under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-262 when the following criteria
are met: (1) "the injury is not catastrophic"; (2) "the employee is not
working"; (3) "the employee has been capable of performing work with
limitations . . . for 52 consecutive weeks" or seventy-eight weeks in the
aggregate; and (4) "[w]ithin 60 days of the employee's release to return to
work with. . . limitations," the employer- gives notice to the employee on
a form provided by the Board of the release to return to work and an
explanation of the limitations or restrictions.3 " Under these specific terms,
an employer/insurer may convert the claimant's benefits from temporary
total disability payments to temporary partial disability benefits.3 2 Failure to give notice of the release to return to work with limitations should
result only in preventing the conversion of benefits in less than seventyeight aggregate weeks, since O.C.G.A. section 34-9-262
provides that "[iun
33
no event shall an employee be eligible for more.1
In this situation, calculating the amount of temporary partial disability
benefits owed under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-262 is unique in that the
claimant has not actually returned to work., Temporary partial disability
benefits were originally intended and traditionally utilized as a supplement for workers injured on the job who return to work at diminished

27. Waycross Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Hiott, 141 Ga. App. 600, 601, 234 S.E.2d 111, 112
(1977) (quoting Employer's Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Hollifield, 93 Ga. App. 51, 52-53, 90
S.E.2d 681, 682 (1955)).
28. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Bristol, 242 Ga. 287, 248 S.E.2d 661 (1978).
29. Cornell-Young (Macon Pre-Stressed Concrete Co.) v. Minter, 168 Ga. App. 325, 309
S.E.2d 159 (1983).
30. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(a)(2) (1992).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. Note that Rule 104 of the Rules and Regulations of the State Board of Workers'
Compensation provide that neither the 52 nor 78-week periods will commence absent proper
notice, but this Rule clearly conflicts with the statute. GA. BD. OF WORKERS COMPENSATION
R. 104.

462
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wages as a result of the on-the-job injury. The formula presently mandated by section 34-9-262 requires the payment of "two-thirds of the difference between the average weekly wage before the injury and the average weekly wage the employee is able to earn thereafter, but not more
than $175 per week for a period not exceeding 350 weeks from the date of
4
injury.'
Therefore, an employee is earning nothing. Weekly benefits payable
under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-104(a)(2) are different from temporary total
disability benefits in only two ways. First, the maximum is $175 rather
than $250 per week.33 Consequently, any employee with an average
weekly wage more than $262.50 will experience a reduction in benefits to
the maximum rate of $175.3' Conversely, employees with. an average
weekly wage of less than $262.50 will not experience a reduction of the
weekly benefit. However, the cap on temporary partial disability benefits
runs 350 weeks from the date of injury rather than 400 weeks provided
37
for noncatastrophic temporary total disability benefits.
Nothing in O.C.G.A. section 34-9-104(a)(2) prevents an employee from
having a change in condition in the traditional sense at any time, either
before or after the fifty-two consecutive weeks or seventy-eight aggregate
weeks in which the claimant was capable of performing work with limitations or restrictions.3 8 For example, if an employer shows the absence of
any limitation related to the on-the-job injury, then temporary disability
benefits may be suspended at any time without a showing of the availability of suitable employment.3 9 In those situations in which'an employee
still suffers limitations in the performance of gainful employment that are
related to the on-the-job injury, an employer may show the availability of
suitable work to suspend the payment of temporary benefits without regard to the fifty-two consecutive or seventy-eight aggregate weeks.' Likewise, if an employee experiences a change in condition for the worse such
that he or she becomes totally disabled, then an employee again will be
entitled to the payment of temporary total disability benefits under
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-261."

34. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-262 (1992).
35. For the compensation available for total disability, see O.C.G.A. § 34-9-261 (1992).
36. 2/3 x [AWW - 6] = TPD, but no more than $175.
37. O.C.G.A. §§ 34-9-261, -262 (1992).

38. Id. § 34-9-104(a)(2).
39. Pierce v. AAA Cabinet Co., 173 Ga. App. 463, 326 S.E.2d 575 (1985).
40. City of Adel v. Wise, 261 Ga. 53, 401 S.E.2d 522 (1991).
41. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-261 (1992).
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D. Access to Medical Records
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-207 has been added to facilitate the collection of
medical data."2 Two situations trigger this section: (1) "When an employee has submitted a claim ...

or is receiving ...

income benefits," or

(2) when "the employer has paid any medical expense.' 43 In either event,
an employee is deemed to have waived "any communication related to
the claim or history or treatment of injury arising from the incident""
between the employee and any physician, "including information relating
to treatment for any mental condition or drug or alcohol abuse."' 4 This
waiver is not limited strictly to any "communications related to the...
injury arising from the incident.'4 The statute must be applied in its
entirety and specifies that the waiver is for any communications concerning the "history or treatment" and directs that "the employee shall provide . . .all information and records related to the examination, treat-

'47
ment, testing, or consultation concerning the employee.
There are two procedures created for obtaining records. First, an employer is entitled to make a simple request for medical records from "any
physician who has examined, treated, or tested the employee. ' '48 Furthermore, the section leaves no discretion to .the physician on whether or not
to produce the records, but directs that the physician "shall provide
within a reasonable time and for a reasonable charge all information and
records . . . . 49 Acknowledging the practical difficulty of obtaining
records without a written authorization, not to mention the requirements
of certain federal privacy laws, the legislature established a procedure
whereby "the employee [is required to] provide the employer with a
signed release for medical records and information related to the claim or
history or treatment of injury arising from the incident, including information related to the treatment for any mental condition or drug or alcohol abuse." 0 The only specific requirement on the language of the release
is that it "shall designate the provider and shall state that it will expire
on the date of the hearing."" In the event any employee refuses to provide such a release, any income benefits being received "shall be sus-

42. Id. § 34-9-207.

43. Id.§ 34-9-207(b).
44. Id. § 34-9-207(a).
45. Id. § 34-9-207(b).
46. Id. § 34-9-207(a).
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 34-9-207(b).
Id.
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pended and no hearing shall be scheduled until such signed release is
provided." '
E. Coordination of Benefits
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-243 was modified by the addition of paragraphs'
(b) through (f) to allow employers to offset weekly benefits by the amount
of payments made to an employee under an employer funded disability
plan." This section provides that:
The employer's obligation to pay or cause to be paid weekly benefits...
shall be reduced by the employer funded portion of payments received
...by the employee pursuant to a disability plan, a wage continuation
plan, or from a disability insurance policy established or maintained by
the same employer .... The employer funded portion shall be based

upon the ratio of the employer's contributions to the total contributions
to such plan or policy.1'

The offset applies to weekly indemnity benefits, not benefits for permanent partial disability impairment rating. B The Board shall establish
rules to facilitate the free exchange of information necessary for this coordination of benefits to function, along with reporting requests for 'any
credits taken.56
F. Attorney Fees
Several changes in the Act directly impact attorney fees. The legislature amended O.C.G.A. section 34-9-108(a) to limit the amount of recovery of attorney fees to no more than "25% of the claimant's award of
weekly [indemnity] benefits or settlement. ' 57 The legislature also
amended O.C.G.A. section 34-9-108(b)(2) to provide for reasonable quantum meruit attorney fees. In instances when the provisions of O.C.G.A.
section 34-9-221 have been violated and an attorney is hired to enforce
the employee's rights under the Act, the fee is limited to quantum~meruit6 8 The amendments to O.C.G.A. section 34-9-108(c) also provide that
an attorney shall not advertise when the attorney or his law firm does not
52. Id.
53, 1992 'Ga. Laws 1942, 1960-61.
54. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-243(b) (1992).
55. Id. § 34-9-243(f).
56. Id. § 34-9-243(d), (e).
57. Id. § 34-9-108(a). Previously, claimant's attorney could recover up to 33-V3% of all
indemnity benefits or settlement amounts. See GA. BD. OF WORKERS COMPENSATION R.
108(a).
58. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-108(b)(2) (1992).
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intend to render the full legal services as advertised."s Additionally, in
only limited exceptions, section 34-9-108(c) prohibits attorneys who are
not associates or partners in the same law firm from dividing a fee for
legal services."'
G. Subrogation
One of the most controversial elements of the 1992 legislation was subrogation, a right that employers enjoyed in the workers' compensation
system until its legislative abolition almost two decades ago. The right of
subrogation has now returned in a form dictated largely by political considerations, and the result is that the new statute does not set out clear
procedural details on enforcing the lien, the right to recovery, or the
amount of potential recovery." Subrogation could easily be the subject of
a lengthy law review article, but it will be only briefly reviewed in this
Article.
An employer/insurer must consider a potential subrogation claim whenever a third party may be liable under tort law to the, injured employee or
the survivors of the deceased employee.62 Determining what may be
claimed in a subrogation action is complex and requires a look at specific
language. O.C.G.A. section 34-9-11.1(b) states that "the employer's or insurer's recovery . . shall be limited to the recovery of the amount of
disability benefits and medical expenses paid. . . and shall only be recoverable if the injured employee has been fully and completely compensated . . .for all economic and non-economic losses incurred as a result
of the injury."6 8
By specifying only "disability benefits" and "medical expenses," the
language leaves unanswered the question of whether the subrogation provision includes rehabilitation expenses, death benefits, or survivors' benefits."4 The subrogation lien appears to be limited to the amount of compensation paid at the time of settlement with or judgment against the
59. Id. § 34-9-108(c).
60. Id. Fees may be divided between unaffiliated attorneys if:
(1) [tjhe client consents to employment of the other attorney after a full disclosure that a fee division will be made; (2) [t]he division is made in proportion to
the services performed and the responsibility assumed by each; and (3) [t]he total
fee of the attorneys does not clearly exceed reasonable compensation for all legal
services such attorneys rendered to the client.

Id.
61. Id.§ 34-9-11.1.
62.
63.

Id. § 34-9-11.1(a).
Id. § 34-9-11.1(b).

64. Id.
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tortfeasor. The lien does not appear to encompass future obligations that
the workers' compensation carrier may have.
Although the statute states that the insurer "rmay intervene in any action to protect and enforce such lien,"6 5 the courts may construe this as a
command since it affects the rights of third persons. The employer/insurer must recognize that a failure to intervene in a lawsuit, of which it
has knowledge and a reasonable opportunity to intervene, may result in a
waiver of its subrogation lien.
During the first year after the accident, the employer/insurer's only
means of protecting its interests is to intervene in any pending action."
The statute is silent as to the consequences of a failure to intervene, but
the case law suggests that the employer/insurer should notify the claimant/employee and any potential tortfeasors of its potential subrogation
lien as soon as possible. Analogous decisions in no fault subrogation
cases strongly suggest that should the injured employee settle the case, a
release of the tortfeasor without the consent of the workers' compensation
insurer will not bar the subrogation lien." s The statute also provides that
65. Id. (emphasis added).
66. Id. § 34-9-11.1(c).
67. See, e.g., Ring v. Williams, 192 Ga. App. 329, 384 S.E.2d 914 (1989).
68. In Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v.. Alterman Foods, Inc., 161 Ga. App. 695,
289 S.E.2d 537 (1982), the court held that the failure to intervene was fatal to the subrogation claim. Id. at 700, 289 S.E.2d at 540. Similarly, in United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.
Carl Subler Trucking Co., 800 F.2d 1540 (11th Cir. 1986) the no fault insurer paid medical
and lost wage benefits under its no fault plan. The injured party filed a personal injury
action to recover for mental and physical pain and suffering, and for past, present, and
future lost wages. Plaintiff received a $75,000 verdict, which was reduced by $18,000 to reflect lost wage benefits already received from USF&G. The tortfeasor, after being constantly
informed both before and after the lawsuit of the amounts that had been paid by USF&G to
the injured party, refused to pay USF&G anything, including the $18,000 that had been
withheld from the jury verdict. USF&G brought an action against the tortfeasor to recover
all sums that it had paid. Id. at 1540-41. The court stated that USF&G had no greater or
lesser rights than its insured, and noted that a cause of action for personal injuries cannot
be split under Georgia law. Id. The court also stated that since the injured party could not
have maintained a separate lawsuit for medical and rehabilitation expenses and could not
bring a lawsuit claiming additional lost wages when the issue had already been adjudicated,
the no fault insurer was barred from instituting a separate lawsuit because it failed to intervene in the insured's lawsuit. Id. at 1542.
. These cases are in contrast to Poole Truck Line, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
163 Ga. App. 755, 294 S.E.2d 570 (1982), in which the court considered the subrogation
claim brought by State Farm under the Georgia Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act.
State Farm's insureds executed a release before State Farm paid any no fault benefits.
When State Farm paid its benefits under the No Fault Act, it attempted to recover these
benefits by asserting its right of subrogation. Id. at 756, 294 S.E.2d at 570. The question was
whether the release, which had been signed before State Farm ever made its payments,
affected the right of subrogation. The court noted that "[i]t has long been established that
'[n]o right of subrogation arises until the insurance is paid.'" Id., 294 S.E.2d at 571 (quoting
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the insurer may recover only if the injured person is "fully. .. compensated . . . for all economic and non-economic losses incurred as a result
of the injury." 69 An employer/insurer cannot necessarily assume that an
injured party has been fully compensated by a verdict in favor of the
injured party. Under the doctrines of contributory and comparative negligence, which are commonly applicable in bodily injury claims, a jury is
instructed that if it finds contributory negligence by the injured party, it
should reduce the damages to reflect the fault of the injured party. In
such cases, although an injured party may receive a judgment, one may
argue that the injured party is not fully compensated for the loss suffered
as a result of the injury.
Although not relevant in a workers' compensation hearing, in a tort suit
arising from a compensable injury, the injured worker's own negligence is
relevant. For example, if an injured worker is forty percent at fault in
causing his own injury and the manufacturer of equipment is sixty percent at fault, then the injured worker may be entitled to recover, but his
recovery would be reduced to reflect his contributory negligence.7 0 It is
unknown if this principle will apply to subrogation claims as well. The
loss incurred can be very different from the "right to recovery." "Right to
recovery" may be discounted heavily to account for comparative negligence. Any verdict or judgment in which a comparative negligence defense was asserted will create problems in defining the extent of the subrogation claim unless the jury makes a finding that comparative

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Austin, 120 Ga. App. 430, 432, 170 S.E.2d 840, 843 (1969)). The court
held that the tortfeasor had constructive notice of the.statutory right of subrogation because
no fault coverage was mandatory in Georgia. Id. at 758, 294 S.E.2d at 572. Accordingly, the
court held that those who use the roads were presumed to know the law giving the insured's
insurance company "a statutory right of subrogation in accidents involving a vehicle weighing more than 6,500 pounds." Id. Therefore, the court stated that when the tortfeasor
sought to settle with the injured party and obtain a release without the insurer's consent,
the tortfeasor is doing so at his own risk. Id. The court noted that the tortfeasor could
"avoid double payment by withholding from the settlement a sum sufficient to satisfy the
insurer's subrogation claim." Id.
69. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11.1(b) (1992). The language is identical to that used formerly in the
No Fault Act, defining the right of subrogation for no fault carriers in accidents involving a
vehicle weighing more than 6,500 pounds. Id. § 33-34-3(d) (1990 & Supp. 1991). The purpose of the language in the no-fault statute was to make sure that the plaintiff got first
access to the assets of the tortfeasor. That purpose was accomplished in the No Fault Act
once any judgment for the injured party was paid and the policy limits were not exhausted.
However, the same argument may not apply in the workers' compensation subrogation
context.
70. Those resisting a subrogation claim will argue that the subrogor has no stronger
claim than the injured party would have had, and therefore, should be subject to the same
contributory/comparative negligence rules as the injured party.
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negligence was not used to reduce the damages award to the plaintiff, or
makes a specific finding as to the amount thereof.
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-11.1(c) provides that any action against another
''person by the injured employee or those to whom his right of action
survives must be instituted in all cases within one year from the date of
injury. ' The existing two-year statute of limitations for personal injury
or wrongful death is not affected,'2 but if the injured party or those to
whom the action survives fails to bring the action within one year, this
operates as an assignment of the right to the employer/insurer.73 The employer/insurer may bring the action in its own name, the name of the
injured employee, or the name of those to whom the right of action survives.' 4 The employer/insurer "may not retain any amount in excess of
the, limit of recovery" as discussed previously, and any net recovery in
excess of the subrogation interest must be paid''"to the injured employee
or those to whom the right of action survives. 17
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-11.1(d) also provides that in the event of a recovery from a third party, the attorney representing the employee or the em-

ployee's survivor "shall be entitled to a reasonable fee for services.'7 If

the employer/insurer engages another attorney to represent the employer/
insurer in pursuing the action against the third party, then a court, upon
application, will apportion fees between the attorney for the employer/
insurer and attorney for the employee."
II. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
Congress passed the Americans' with Disabilities Act 8 ("ADA") and
President Bush signed it into law in relative obscurity on July 26, 1990.
Referred to by some as an "emancipation proclamation" for the dis71. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11.1(c) (1992).
72. Id. § 9-3-33 (1982).
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. § 34-9-11.1(c).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 34-9-11.1(d).

77. Id. It should be noted that State Bar Ethical Request No. 90-R6 dealt with the hypothetical situation of whether one attorney can properly represent a subrogation interest of
an insurance company on a property damage claim while at the same time representing the
injured pariy in a personal injury action. Acknowledging the troublesome nature of allocating any recovery between the liquidated damages of the subrogated property loss and the
unliquidated damages of the personal injury claim, the State Bar opined that only "the
most sophisticated of insureds could intelligently waive such a conflict" and concluded that
attorneys would be precluded from representing both the insurer and the insured "in almost

all such cases." Id.
78. The Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (1988 & Supp.
1990).
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abled 7 9 it is estimated that the ADA will affect approximately 43,000,000
disabled Americans."0 Almost entirely unforeseen at the time this law was
passed, however, were the ADA's implications for workers' compensation
laws around the country. In attempting to address employment based discrimination against the disabled, the ADA simultaneously has had a significant impact on a number of workers' compensation issues, primarily
pre-employment inquiries, return to work issues, and potential retaliatory
discharge claims.
A.

Pre-Employment Inquiries

At the core of the ADA's protection for the disabled is the prohibition
against any inquiry by an employer to an applicant phrased in terms of a
disability.81 This precludes any pre-employment inquiry, in a written application or otherwise, relating to physical or mental impairments, prior
injuries, or even prior workers' compensation claims.8 2 Apart from drastically affecting how employers may assess the potential insurance risk of a
job applicant, the ADA's limitations on pre-employment inquiries raise
significant questions about the so-called "Rycroft" defense, and how an
employer may perfect a claim against the Subsequent Injury Trust Fund
3
("SITF" or "the Fund").8

In Georgia Electric Co. v. Rycroft,'8 the Georgia Supreme Court established a defense to workers' compensation claims in which the employee
makes a knowing and willful misrepresentation concerning his physical
condition, the employer relies on the false representation as a substantial
factor in hiring the employee, and a causal connection develops between
the false representation and a subsequent on-the-job injury." This defense, which exists in numerous jurisdictions around the country,80 is
designed to combat claims that result from fraud in the hiring process. In
contrast, claims by employers against the Georgia Subsequent Injury
79.

Roy Weathersby & Dion Kohler, The Americans With Disabilities Act: An Over-

view, 27 GA.
80.

ST.

B.J. 131 (1991).

42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (Supp. II 1990).

81. Id. § 12112(c)(2)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.13(b) (1991).
82. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.13(a) (1991).
83.

The Georgia Subsequent Injury Trust Fund provisions are codified at O.C.G.A. §§

34-9-350 to -367 (1992).
84.

259 Ga. 155, 378 S.E.2d 111 (1989).

85. Id. at 159, 378 S.E.2d at 114.
86. See 1B ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 47.53 (1992); Givens v. Steel Structures, Inc., 301 S.E.2d 545 (S.C. 1983); Shippers Transp. of Georgia v.
Stepp, 578 S.W.2d 232 (Ark. 1979); Martinez v. Driver Mechenbier, Inc., 562 P.2d 843 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1977); Blanton v. Workmen's Comp. Bd., 531 S.W.2d 518 (Ky. Ct. App. 1976);
Federal Copper & Aluminum Co. v. Dickey, 493 S.W.2d 463 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973).
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Trust Fund87 arise from an employer's knowledge of an employee's preexisting permanent impairment when that condition merges with a jobrelated injury to create a greater degree of workers' compensation liability." Similar to the ADA, the SITF attempts to promote the hiring of the
disabled, and does so by providing reimbursement for those workers'
compensation claims that are either caused or accelerated by a pre-existing condition."
Obviously, a key to both a Rycroft defense and a SITF claim is what
the employer knew, or did not know, about the employee's physical condition at the time of hire. Typically, this' is established at trial by use of
the employment application as evidence. The ADA's prohibition against
pre-employment inquiry regarding any physical or mental impairment
drastically alters how an employer may prove the elements of employer
knowledge crucial to Rycroft defenses and SITF claims. This problem,
however, ultimately should not prove to be insurmountable to either
issue.
Rycroft provides a useful example of how this defense may survive the'
ADA's prohibition against pre-employment medical inquiries.9 The employer/insurer's defense in Rycroft was based upon the claimant's misrepresentations regarding a prior back condition and concurrent workers'
compensation claim in response to specific questions placed in a written
employment application." Since the ADA now prohibits such questions
in employment applications, the question arises whether the Rycroft defense is now moot. The answer should be no.
Although the facts of the decision in Rycroft concerned an employment
application, the holding itself was based upon the well-settled principle
that fraud in the inception of a contract makes the contract voidable. 2
Although the ADA prohibits medical inquiries at the pre-employment
stage, it does not prohibit such inquiries made after an offer of employment and before the employee actually begins work, provided that all entering employees in the same job category are subject to the same inquiry.93 An employer may, therefore, ask the same questions about an
employee's physical or mental condition after the offer of employment is
made as it may formerly have asked in a pre-employment application or

87.
88.

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-350 to -367 (1992).
Id. § 34-9-350,

89. Id.
90. 259 Ga. 155, 378 S.E.2d 111 (1989).
91.
92.
of law
at the

93.

Id. at 156, 378 S.E.2d at 112.
Id. at 159, 378 S.E.2d at 114. As the court stated: "it is a historically sound principle
that a contractual relationship procured through fraud makes the contract voidable
behest of the injured party." Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 13-5-5 (1988)).
42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3) (Supp. 1990).
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interview. In fact, ADA guidelines published by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") specifically recognize an employer's
need to collect information for subsequent injury fund claims as a legitimate business, purpose in post-offer medical inquiries and examinations."
Assuming, therefore, that the claimant in Rycroft lied about his physical condition in a post-offer medical -inquiry, rather than in a pre-employment application, the result should be no different. The supreme court
supported its decision in Rycroft by stating that "there is a presumption
that an employer takes an employee as he finds him, the courts cited
above have found it persuasive that an employer be able to rely on the
employee's description of his physical condition."" Clearly, an employer's
reliance on a post-offer medical inquiry is no less real than the reliance in
Rycroft. Moreover, with the prohibitions and remedies provided by the
ADA, there should be less incentive for an employee to conceal or misrepresent a pre-existing condition.
The ADA's effect on potential SITF claims will be less dramatic than
with Rycroft defenses. Unlike the issue in Rycroft, SITF claims never
have been dependent on employer knowledge at the pre-offer stage. The
fact that employment applications have been frequently used to prove
employer knowledge of a pre-existing condition is simply a by-product of
medical inquiries on previous employment applications. Employers who
conduct their medical inquiries in compliance with the ADA will continue
to be able to establish, their knowledge of an employee's pre-existing condition. Because such inquiries now will be more specifically directed at
potential SITF claims, and at making reasonable accommodations under
the ADA for disabled employees," proving employer knowledge in SITF
claims may actually become easier.
B. Return 'to Work Issues
One of the primary purposes of any workers' compensation act is the
ultimate return of the injured workers to active employment.9 7 Although
returning the injured worker to employment is advantageous to both parties, doing so is largely aspirational under Georgia's Workers' Compensation Act. An employer, for example, may elect to simply pay a claimant
'disability benefits or help him find work with another employer rather
than modifying his former job or placing him in another light-duty posi94. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b) (1991).
95. 259 Ga. at 159, 378 S.E.2d at 114.
96. The ADA requires that employers provide "reasonable accommodation" to disabled
employees. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. 11 1990).
97. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200(a) (1992) for example, requires employers to furnish injured
employees medical care and "other treatment" that is both reasonably required and likely
to
effect a cure, give relief "or restore the employee to suitable employment." Id.
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tion. The ADA, however, alters an employer's obligations in dealing with
injured employees.
The ADA requires that employers provide "reasonable accommodations" to the disabled, including those employees who have been injured
on the job. 8 The ADA's definition of "reasonable accommodation" includes "job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, [and) acquisition or modification of equipment
or devices." 99 The "reasonable accommodation" requirements of the ADA
clearly impose a new burden on employers to accommodate injured workers with light-duty employment when appropriate. This new burden,
however, is not without limitations.
The EEOC has stated that an employer is not required to reallocate the
essential functions of a job, but rather only marginal functions, in order
to provide a reasonable accommodation.10 The EEOC uses the example
of a security guard who develops a visual impairment and is thereafter
unable to inspect company identification cards.10 1 Since inspecting identification cards is essential to the security guard position, the employer
would not be obligated to modify the security guard job to accommodate
the employee's visual disability. If the disability only affects more marginal aspects of the job, however, (for example filling out written reports)
restructuring of the job would be appropriate as a reasonable accommodation, since this aspect of the job is not necessarily essential.102 In addition, the ADA does not require that an employer create a new job or remove another employee from an existing job to provide reassignment as a
reasonable accommodation.103 An employer is not required'to promote an
0
individual with a disability to make such an accommodation.' '
Although the EEOC has attempted to establish some guidelines as to
what exactly constitutes a "reasonable accommodation," it is apparent
that this vague term will be the subject of substantial litigation. Exactly
how far an employer must go to provide a "reasonable accommodation"
to injured employees is uncertain at present, but there can be no doubt
that this provision of the ADA will significantly affect how employers approach return to work issues under the Act.
98.
99.
100.

42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(a) (Supp. 1990).
Id. § 12111(9)(B).
EEOC

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

AND INTERPRETIVE INDEX

MANUAL, APPENDIX

101.

Id.

102.

42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (Supp. 1992).
TITLE 1 REGULATIONS AND INTERPRETIVE
Id. at B-24.

103. EEOC
104.

B EEOC

TITLE

B-23 (1992).

INDEX,

at B-23-24.

1
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C. Retaliatory Discharge
Another potentially unforeseen impact of the ADA is the creation of
what amounts to a federal retaliatory discharge statute. Such statutes
typically provide a remedy outside the workers' compensation act when
the employee has been terminated in retaliation for the bringing of a
workers' compensation claim.10 5 Georgia law, which follows the "at-will"
employment doctrine,'" has not yet recognized a separate statutory remedy for retaliatory discharge claims. The ADA, however, effectively supplies a remedy when an employer terminates an injured worker solely because of a disability, job-related or otherwise. The termination of an
employee in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim would
constitute an employment action taken because of a disability on the part
of the employee, and thus, would be illegal under the ADA."' Undoubtedly, the presence of such a remedy will spark additional litigation when
termination occurs during, or shortly after, a heated workers' compensation claim.
One should not assume, however, that the ADA provides a remedy for
every termination that occurs after the filing of a workers' compensation
claim. Although the ADA imposes a duty upon employers to provide reasonable accommodations, it does not absolve employees from complying
with other duties properly imposed by the employer. For example, discovery that an employee committed fraud in the workers' compensation process may constitute valid grounds for termination that would not lead to
an ADA remedy. Moreover, if the injured worker had been out of work
for a long period of time, and his former position had to be filled by the
employer, and no other jobs were available, the employer would not necessarily be obligated under the ADA to create a position for the
claimant. 0 8
The various remedies available under the ADA will undoubtedly affect
how employers approach workers' compensation claims, since, unlike
other federal discrimination laws, the ADA will overlap to a great extent
with workers' compensation. As the ADA is interpreted by federal courts,
workers' compensation practitioners should take note and be alert to potential repercussions in the workers' compensation system.
105.

See Shoemaker v. Myers, 801 P.2d 1054 (Cal. 1990).

106. O.C.G.A.
(1973).
107.
108.

§ 34-7-1

(1992); Land v. Delta Air Lines, 130 Ga. App. 321, 203 S.E.2d 316

42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (Supp. II 1990).
Id. § 12111(9); see supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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CASE LAW DEVELOPMENTS

Any Evidence

During previous survey periods, the court of appeals issued numerous
decisions involving the "any evidence" rule. In Elbert County Board of
Commissioners v. Burnett, ' the claimant, an employee of the Elbert
County Sheriff's Department, was injured while breaking up a fight between two individuals. He subsequently left the sheriff's department, and
filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits maintaining that he suffered organic brain damage. In support of his claim, Burnett presented
the testimony of several experts. In defending the claim, the employer
submitted expert testimony from one clinical neuropsychologist. After reviewing medical records, reviewing tests, and interviewing the employee
for approximately two hours, the neuropsychologist opined that the employee's problems were not caused by the work accident.1'0 The Board
denied benefits, but the superior court reversed. The court of appeals
held this was error, noting that the Board had authority to disregard a
"'whole college of physicians.' "
Because there was evidence to support
the denial of benefits, albeit only one expert as opposed to the four opinions presented by the employee, the superior court was without authority
to reverse. 2
Medical opinions and the "any evidence" rule came into play in SMB
Stage Line, Inc. v. Leach.'13 Leach filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits, which was initially denied by the Administrative Law Judge
("AL") on the grounds that her injury resulted from a congenital condition as opposed to a work-related accident. The denial was based on medical reports submitted by the parties. The full Board reversed, awarding
benefits based on a finding that although Leach suffered from a pre-existing condition, it was aggravated by work. The superior court affirmed
the finding of an aggravation, but remanded the case, directing the full
Board to apportion the benefits to eliminate those expenses that were
attributable to the congenital condition. " 4 The court of appeals reversed."', The court reinstated the decision of the full Board and held
that there was no requirement for apportionment under the Act unless

109.

200 Ga. App. 379, 408 S.E.2d 168 (1991).

110. Id. at 379-81, 408 S.E.2d at 169-70.
111. Id. at 382, 408 S.E.2d at 171 (quoting B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Arnold, 88 Ga. App. 64,
70, 76 S.E.2d 20, 23 (1953)).

112. Id.
113.

204 Ga. App. 229, 418 S.E.2d 791 (1992).

114. Id. at 229, 418 S.E.2d at 792.
115. Id. at 231, 418 S.E.2d at 794.
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the claim involved an occupational disease. 6 If a work injury aggravates
a pre-existing
congenital condition, then it is fully compensable as a new
7
accident.'

1

The question of weight and credit given to evidence, including testimony of witnesses, is a proper one for the Board as the trier of fact. 1
This principle was confirmed in at least three decisions during the survey
period. In McLeroy Plumbing Service, Inc. v. Starks,"9 the court of appeals affirmed an award of benefits, noting that although the claimant's
testimony may have been impeached at the hearing, it was supported by
unimpeached testimony from the treating physician.2 0 Thus, there was
competent evidence to support the award of benefits to the employee. In
Sunbelt Specialties v. Keith,12' the Superior Court of Camden County
remanded a case to the Board for consideration of an issue that it believed the ALJ had overlooked. 22 The court of appeals disagreed, holding
that this was not the case, and that the ALJ had denied benefits based on
the employee's lack of credibility and the inadequacy of his own medical
evidence. 28 The denial of benefits was upheld.12 4 In the last case involving the question of credibility, Gasses v. Professional Plumbing Co.,1 2 5

the court of appeals held that an award of benefits is proper even though
it was supported only by the employee's self-serving statements. 26 In
Gasses the superior court reversed the award of benefits apparently based
on a finding that the employee's testimony was outweighed by the opinions of three physicians who felt he could work without restrictions. As
noted above, and although it might seem illogical, the Board may ignore
"a whole college of physicians" when awarding or denying benefits.2 7
In Conwood Corp. v. Guinn,12 8 the court of appeals considered the issue
of whether there was any evidence to support the finding that the principle location of an employment relationship was in Georgia. Pointing to
the record, the court of appeals held that there was such evidence, specifi116. Id.

117. Id.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
170-71
128.

Howard Sheppard, Inc. v. McGowan, 137 Ga. App. 408, 224 S.E.2d 65 (1976).
201 Ga. App. 270, 410 S.E.2d 756 (1991).
Id. at 272, 410 S.E.2d at 758.
201 Ga. App. 167, 410 S.E.2d 364 (1991).
Id. at 167, 410 S.E.2d at 364.
Id. at 168, 410 S.E.2d at 365.
Id.
204 Ga. App. 69, 418 S.E.2d 424 (1992).
Id. at 70-71, 418 S.E.2d at 425-26.
Elbert County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Burnett, 200 Ga. App. 379, 382, 408 S.E.2d 168,
(1991).
201 Ga. App. 43, 410 S.E.2d 315 (1991).
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cally the employee's own testimony, and affirmed the decisions of the
Board and superior court. 129
B. Arising Out of and in Course of Employment
The most interesting decision in the "arising out of and in the course of
8
' Kin,
employment" section 80 came in Goode Bros. Poultry Co. v. Kin.1
an employee of Goode Brothers, died suddenly and unexpectedly during
his normal working hours. No signed death certificate was issued, nor was
an autopsy performed. Kin's dependents filed a claim for benefits, arguing that because the death was unexplained, they were entitled to the
presumption that it arose out of and in the course of employment. The
employer countered with medical testimony to the effect that Kin died
from a pre-existing heart condition, which not only explained the cause of
death, but which also purportedly showed that it was not attributable to
his employment. 8 2 Despite the lack of a death certificate or autopsy, the
ALJ found that the death was unexplained, thus rejecting the employer's
medical evidence that Kin died from a heart attack. " If the employer
had been successful, then it would have had the burden of overcoming the
natural inference [that] the death was work-related if the evidence shows
the work engaged in by the employee was sufficiently strenuous or of
such a nature that, combined with other facts of the case as to raise such
a natural inference through human experience that the exertion contributed toward the precipitation of the heart attack.'"
Because the employer failed to rebut the presumption of the unexplained
death, there was no need to delve into the possibility of a heart attack,
and the award of benefits was affirmed." 5
Two cases during this survey period concerned assaults on employees.
In Williams v. Atlanta Family Restaurants;Inc.,'8 the claimant traveled
"to Commerce, Georgia to assist in the training of waitresses for a new
Shoney's restaurant.' 8 7 While in Commerce, she and several other members of the training staff were housed at the Econo Lodge motel, and the
supervisory personnel stayed at a nearby Holiday Inn, which had laundry
129. Id.at 44-45, 410 S.E.2d at 316.
130. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4) (1992).
131. 201 Ga. App. 557, 411 S.E.2d 724 (1991).
132. Id. at 557-58, 411 S.E.2d at 724.
133. Id. at 558, 411 S.E.2d at 725.
134. Id., 411 S.E.2d at 726 (quoting LaVista Equip. Supply v. Elliott, 186 Ga. App. 585,
587, 367 S.E.2d 811, 812-13 (1988)).
135. Id. at 558-59, 411 S.E.2d at 726.
136. 204 Ga. App. 343, 419 S.E.2d 328 (1992).
137. Id. at 344, 419 S.E.2d at 328.
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facilities. One evening, Williams and another employee went to the Holiday Inn to do their laundry. While waiting for it to finish, they went to
the lounge to eat and have drinks.18 8 "At approximately 11:00 p.m., Williams' roommate informed her that the laundry was finished and that she
was returning to the Econo Lodge."' 8 Williams decided to stay at the
lounge to socialize. Later that evening, she rejected an offer by her supervisor to take her back to the Econo Lodge. Instead, she left the Holiday
Inn at approximately midnight with a woman and three men that she had
met that evening. Unfortunately, she was attacked shortly thereafter,
which led to the filing of this workers' compensation claim.'"
The ALJ denied the claim after finding that Williams "'stepped aside
from her job'" when she refused the offer of a ride back to the Econo
Lodge from her supervisors and remained in the lounge.14 ' Both the full
Board and the superior court affirmed. 4 The court of appeals also affirmed the ALJ's decision. 8 The court contrasted a 1972 decision, Mc4 in which
Donald v. State Highway Department,"
the employee, who was
staying at a hotel while working out of town, injured himself when he fell
down a flight of stairs. Even though McDonald had consumed alcohol
prior to t&e fall, the court affirmed his award of benefits based on a finding that he had conducted himself in a "'normal and prudent manner.' "145 The court of appeals then focused on Williams' conduct, holding
that when she rejected offers for a ride back to the Econo Lodge by her
employer, choosing instead to leave with strangers, she was no longer in
6
the course of her employment."

In the second assault case, Maxwell v. Hospital Authority of Dade,
Walker & Catoosa Counties,147 the employee opted for filing a tort claim
against her employer. Just after completing her shift in the early morning
hours of May 6, 1990, Maxwell was robbed, raped, and beaten in the employee parking lot. Although she conceded that her injuries arose in the
course of her employment, Maxwell filed a tort claim, arguing that the
injuries did not "arise out of" her employment and, therefore, the exclusive remedy provisions of the Act did not bar her suit. The basis of her
claim was that her attacker obviously singled her out due to her dress and
jewelry, and because the assault was "personal" in nature, she should be
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
Id., 419 S.E.2d at 328-29.
Id., 419 S.E.2d at 329.
Id. (quoting the ALJ order).
Id. at 343-44, 419 S.E.2d at 329.
Id. at 346, 419 S.E.2d at 330.
127 Ga. App. 171, 192 S.E.2d 919 (1972).
Id. at 176, 192 S.E.2d at 923.
204 Ga. App. at 345, 419 S.E.2d at 330.
202 Ga. App. 92, 413 S.E.2d 205 (1991).
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able to proceed in tort. "1 The superior court disagreed, granting her employer summary judgment. 49 After.reviewing the record, the court of appeals affirmed, rejecting Ms. Maxwell's argument that the assault was
purely personal, and held that her "'employment did not merely provide
the time and place for the assault upon her, but that the same increased
the risk of the attack, and subjected her to a danger peculiar to the employment."'i. The fact that the attacker knew how Maxwell normally
dressed at work and the type of jewelry she wore "highlighted" the fact
that his knowledge of her was connected with the workplace.6 1 Maxwell's
tort claim was barred because her injury "arose out of, and in the course
of" her employment.
In Tate v. Bruno's, Inc./Food Max, 1 52 the court of appeals considered
the compensability of a parking lot accident. On October 16, 1989, Tate
completed her shift, clocked-out, and walked directly from her employer's
store to her car in a parking lot that was used both by patrons and employees. After letting her car warm up for a few minutes, Tate was backing up when a truck struck her vehicle. The record showed that approximately ten minutes had elapsed between her clocking-out and the time of
the accident. 9 In its opinion, the court of appeals initially stated that
the general rule was that accidents sustained while going to or from work
were not compensable. s However, the court noted that an employee's
period of employment also included a "'reasonable time for ingress to
and egress from the place of work, while on the employer's premises.' "5'
In this case, the accident "occurred in a public parking lot which was
neither owned, controlled, nor maintained by the employer."1 1 Thus, the
court affirmed the denial of benefits even though the parking lot was adjacent to the employer's place of business and was the location at which
the employee's parked their automobiles. 167 That the employer may not
own or maintain the lot should not end the inquiry since "control" by the
employer would suffice.1 6 Unfortunately, this decision was silent as to
whether the employee made any inquiry into the possibility of whether

148. Id. at 92-95, 413 S.E.2d at 205-07.
149. Id. at 92, 413 S.E.2d at 205.
150. Id. at 95, 413 S.E.2d at 207 (quoting Employers Ins. Co. of Ala. v. Wright, 108 Ga.
App. 380, 383, 133 S.E.2d 39, 41 (1963)).
151. Id. at 92, 413 S.E.2d at 207.
152. 200 Ga. App. 395, 408 S.E.2d 456 (1991).
153. Id. at 396, 408 S.E.2d at 457.
154. Id.
155. Id. (quoting Knight-Ridder Newspaper v. Desselle, 176 Ga. App. 174, 175, 335
S.E.2d 458, 459 (1985)).
156. Id. at 397, 408 S.E.2d at 458.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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the employer had any control over this particular parking lot by way of a
lease or other agreement with the owner of the shopping center. Indeed,
because this apparently was the only lot in which the employees could
park, it is difficult to square this decision with the multitude of cases
requiring a liberal construction of the Act to effectuate its humane
objectives.159
Although independent contractors may have "ill-defined parameters of
employment," they must nevertheless show that their injuries resulted
from an accident arising out of and in the course of their employment in
order to obtain workers' compensation benefits. 60 In Winn Express Co. v.
Hall, 'e the 'claimant, a truck driver, was undisputably an independent
contractor, but was nevertheless covered by his employer's workers' compensation policy pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 34-9-124. Although the
claimant usually commenced his workday by picking up his truck, which
he owned, at his employer's terminal, and completed his workday by returning to the terminal at the end of the day, on occasion, he was permitted to drive the truck home so that he could begin the next day's work
from that location. His employer allowed him to go home without returning to the terminal if it was more convenient so long as he sent his
paperwork in through another driver before the end of the day. The starting or ending point had no effect on his income since the claimant's employer paid a percentage of the customer's fee for hauling the load. Hall
had purchased his own insurance to cover the truck for those occasions on
which he was not driving for his employer.'2
On the day of the accident, Hall drove the truck to and from work
because his personal vehicle had broken down. Hall testified that he was
"usually told" to call the dispatcher before 5:00 p.m., but he could not
remember whether he did so on that date. Within a couple of blocks from
his last'delivery, at about 2:30 p.m., Hall was involved in an accident that
caused injuries to his lower back and right leg. In addition to receiving
benefits from his personal insurance policy, Hall filed a claim for workers'
compensation benefits.' 3 The Board denied the claim on the grounds
that the "injuries did not arise out of his employment because he was on
his way home in his own vehicle, was not paid for his transportation and

159. See, e.g., Brannon v. Georgia Bureau of Investigation, 146 Ga. App. 524, 246 S.E.2d
511 (1978). There is authority in other jurisdictions that, if applied to these facts, may have
allowed Tate to recover. Livingstone v. Abraham & Straus, Inc., 524 A.2d 876 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1987), aff'd, 543 A.2d 45 (N.J. 1988); 1 ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION § 15.42(a) (1992).
160. Winn Express Co. v. Hall, 202 Ga. App. 45, 47, 413 S.E.2d 505, 507 (1991).
161. 202 Ga. App. 45, 413 S:E.2d 505 (1991).
162. Id. at 45-46, 413 S.E.2d at 506.
163. Id. at 46, 413 S.E.2d at 506.
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was not performing any activity for the employer while en route to or
from his home." 16' After determining that Corbin v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.' did not govern this case, the superior court reversed, noting that not only was Hall permitted to begin and end his workday from
home, but when the accident occurred he still was on call, even though
there was no further assignment for him at that time. " The court of
appeals reversed, pointing to the Board's finding of fact that Hall was not
under the direction and control of the employer at the time of the accident because there was no further work for him that day.'67 Even though
Hall was an independent contractor, he was not removed from the general
rule that injuries sustained while going to or from work are not compensable. There was no evidence to show that Hall was on call or that he was
requested or permitted to drive the truck to his home for the mutual benefit of both parties. On this day, Hall had not been given any further
assignments, which he could have refused, and he was driving the truck
home not because of a destination on the following morning, but because
he was without the use of his own personal vehicle. 68
C.

Attorney Fees

The choice of insurance carrier was an unfortunate one for the employer in Claxton Manufacturing Co. v. Hodges.'1 On the date the claimant was injured, Claxton was insured by American Mutual Liability Insurance Company. Because the carrier had processed the claim in an
untimely manner, the Board assessed attorney fees pursuant to O.C.G.A.
section 34-9-108. American Mutual became insolvent approximately two
years later, and the Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool ("GIIP") resumed
payment of the disability benefits. However, because GIIP was'not responsible for attorney fees as a matter of law,17 0 the carrier discontinued
these payments. The employee subsequently filed a claim against his former employer seeking payment of the attorney fees. Since the Board assessed the fees against the employer/insurer in the original award, the
Board ordered Claxton to continue to pay these amounts although the
assessment may have been made because of its former insurer's conduct. "' The court of appeals affirmed.'7
164. Id. at 46, 413 S.E.2d at 506.
165. 117 Ga. App. 823, 162 S.E.2d 226 (1968).
166. 202 Ga. App. at 46, 413 S.E.2d at 506.
167. Id. at 47, 413 S.E.2d at 507.
168. Id.
169. 201 Ga. App. 371, 411 S.E.2d 109 (1991).
170. O.C.G.A. § 33-36-3(2)(G) (1992).
171. 201 Ga. App. at 371-72, 411 S.E.2d at 110.
172. Id. at 372, 411 S.E.2d at 110.
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However, in Goode Bros. Poultry Co. v.'Kin,' " the court reversed the
assessment of attorney fees.'7 4 The award had been based on findings by
the ALJ that defendant proceeded on unreasonable grounds and "'[that
the] claim was controverted by [the employer/insurer], pursuant to
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-221(d), prior to conducting any reasonable investigation.' ""5 The court rejected both of these findings, holding that although the award of compensation might have been authorized by the
Board, it certainly was not demanded.' 6 Not only had the employer/insurer made a reasonable attempt to convince the ALJ that the presumption of an unexplained death was inapplicable, but the court pointed out
that O.C.G.A. section 34-9-221 does not require a "reasonable investigation" before filing a notice to controvert.1 7 This section only requires
-that a party give notice, and that the notice specify the "'ground upon
which the right to compensate is controverted.' ",",s
D.

Average Weekly Wage

In Atlanta Journal& Constitution v. Sims,"79 the court of appeals considered whether mileage expenses should be considered income for use in
the average weekly wage computation. In his decision, the ALJ relied
upon Board Rule 260, which provides that" '[c]omputation of wages shall
include, in addition to salary, hourly pay, or tips, the reasonable value of
food, housing, and other benefits furnished by the employer without
charge to the employee which are listed as earned income on employee's
Federal Form W-2 for federal income tax purposes.' ,,s The ALJ held
against the employee on the grounds that because she did not include the
mileage reimbursement in her taxable income, it should not be included
in the average weekly wage. The superior court had difficulty with the
ALJ's use of the term "taxable income" when the rule itself referred to
"earned income." Thus, it remanded the case for an interpretation, which
led to this appeal.' 8 '
Although Board Rule 260(a) clearly was written to include "the reasonable value of food, housing, and other benefits furnished by the employer
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
defense

201 Ga. App. 557, 411 S.E.2d 724 (1991).
Id. at 561, 411 S.E.2d at 728.
Id. at 560, 411 S.E.2d at 727.
Id. at 560-61, 411 S.E.2d at 727-28.
Id. However, the Act does not require the employer/insurer to have a "reasonable"
if the claim is controverted. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-108(b)(1) (1992). If not, attorney fees

may be assessed.
178.
179.
180.
181.

201 Ga. App. at 560, 411 S.E.2d at 727 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 34-9-221(d) (1992)).
200 Ga. App. 236, 407 S.E.2d 464 (1991).
Id. at 236, 407 S.E.2d at 465 (emphasis added).
Id. at 238-39, 407 S.E.2d at 466-67.
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without charge to the employee""" only if listed on a Form W-2 for federal income tax purposes, the court of appeals sided with the superior
court and found that there was an ambiguity."'5 Apparently, this resulted
from the court of appeals' inability to find a definition for "earned income" in the Internal Revenue Code.1 84 After stating as much, the court
discussed certain rules of construction and prior decisions on average
weekly wage, ultimately holding that the employee would be entitled to
any portion of the mileage payments that might constitute real economic
gain to her."' In other words, the employee would be entitled to any
amount above and beyond the actual expense she incurred by using ,her
own automobile during the course of her employment. The decision may
be just, but it overlooks the Board's authorization by law to "make rules,
not inconsistent with this chapter, for carrying out this chapter."' 18 If the
court concluded that Board Rule 260 was not consistent with the Act,
then it 'should have stated so rather than searching for an ambiguity that,
on the face of the rule, does not appear to be present. Because it is very
difficult for both sides to establish an average weekly wage, especially
when trying to ascertain a value on "other benefits," the Board promulgated this rule to ease the burden by requiring that items other than salary, hourly pay, or tips be included on the Form W-2.1" Unfortunately,
this case revives the very problems that the rule sought to cure.
In a subsequent decision, Pizza Hut Delivery v. Blackwell, " a case
concerning whether tips should be included, the court of appeals seems to
have confirmed that Board Rule 260(a) is not ambiguous."8 ' In Pizza Hut
Delivery, the employer convinced the ALJ to exclude tips from the average weekly wage computation so that they were not listed as earned income on the employee's Form W-2. The full Board disagreed, adding the
tips to the average weekly wage. The superior court affirmed, and on appeal the court of appeals pointed out that "tip" income is found in a
separate section of the rule, and is not required to be listed on the Form
W-2.190 Furthermore, as pointed out by the court, tips have long been
held to be included in the average weekly wage computation. Although
the court found Board Rule 260(a) to be' unambiguous in this case, it nevertheless felt compelled to support its earlier decision in Sims, stating
182. GA. BD. OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION R. 206 (O.C.G.A. tit. 34 (1992)).
183. 200 Ga. App. at 238-39, 407 S.E.2d at 466-67.
184. The Internal Revenue Code is currently codified at 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-9602 (West
1988 & Supp. 1992).
185. 200 Ga. App. at 237-38, 407 S.E.2d at 465-66.
186. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-60 (1992).
187. GA. BD. OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION R. 260 (O.C.G.A. tit. 34 (1992)).
188. 204 Ga. App. 112, 418 S.E.2d 639 (1992).
189. Id, at 113, 418 S.E.2d at 640.
190. Id. at 112, 418 S.E.2d at 640.
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that it would interpret tips to be reported on the Form W-2 and that
even if the employee failed to do so, the court would not estop an employee from including tips in the computation of his average weekly
wage.191 This statement is superfluous in that it fails to add anything to
the opinion when Board Rule 260(a) has never required an employee to
list tips on the Form W-2 in order to use them in the computation of
average weekly wage. ' "

E. Change in Condition
Under Georgia law, it is well-settled that when an employee suffers an
on-the-job injury, returns to gainful employment, and subsequently seeks
the recommencement of temporary total disability benefits, the burden of
proof is on the employee to "show that his inability to secure suitable
employment elsewhere was proximately caused by his previous accidental
injury."1 3 The court of appeals revisited this issue in Aden's Minit Market v. Landon'" and emphasized the necessity for strict adherence to this
evidentiary principle.
Landon, the claimant, was injured while working for Aden's. Her employer paid temporary total disability benefits, which were subsequently
stopped, and then partial disability benefits, which started because she
returned to full-time employment. Her subsequent employer terminated
her on the basis of misconduct, since she was illegally receiving total disability benefits under the Act while working. The Board awarded the recommencement of total disability benefits upon her termination and the
superior court affirmed. 1"
The court of appeals reversed the award of benefits on the finding that
the claimant had not met her burden.' 9 "We cannot presume that Landon was not hired because of her disability .

. .

. An employee is not

entitled to resumption of total disability payments
merely because she
19 7
was terminated from subsequent employment.'

In acknowledging the well-settled principle that the claimant must
carry the burden of showing that the inability to secure suitable employment elsewhere is proximately caused by the previous accidental injury,
the court noted that the claimant's testimony that she had sought employment elsewhere was insufficient, standing alone, since "the record
191.
192.
193.
(1978).
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id.at 113, 418 S.E.2d at 640.
GA. BD. OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION R. 206 (O.C.G.A. tit. 34 (1992)).
Hartford Accident & Casualty Co. v. Bristol, 242 Ga. 287, 288, 248 S.E.2d 661, 662
202 Ga. App. 219, 413 S.E.2d 738 (1991).
Id. at 219, 413 S.E.2d at 739.
Id. at 220-21, 413 S.E.2d at 740.
Id. at 220, 413 S.E.2d at 740.
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[was] silent on the reasons why she was not hired by any of these other
employers."' 98 Consequently, when the evidence establishes that a claimant is capable of performing some form of gainful employment and is not
totally disabled, the claimant must show not only that reasonable efforts
have been made to secure suitable employment, but also that these efforts
have not been successful because of the physical impairment from the
previous on-the-job injury.' 9
F. Coverage and Jurisdiction
Although not frequently seen at the State Board, coverage questions do
arise on occasion. In Travelers Insurance Co. v. Adkins, °° the court of
appeals considered a coverage question that required examination of the
parties' past conduct. Adkins sustained a work-related injury while in the
employ of Labor Services, Inc. ("LSI") on July 15, 1988. The insurance
carrier,, Travelers, controverted the claim because LSI's policy had been
cancelled on May 1, 1988.201 The Board found against Travelers, and the
court of appeals affirmed, holding that during their relationship, LSI and
Travelers had established a course of conduct whereby the insurer would
cancel the employer's coverage for non-payment of premiums, but would
reinstate coverage retroactively upon receipt of the payment.20 2 This cancellation and reinstatement of coverage went on for a period in excess of
one year, and in fact occurred just prior to Adkins' injury. Furthermore,
and perhaps more importantly, not only had Travelers mailed LSI a premium notice on the third policy, the one which was to be in effect at the
time of Adkins' injury, but LSI made payment of same, which was accepted by Travelers prior to the accident.20 8 The fact that Travelers may
have cancelled properly under the applicable insurance Code section and
also filed written notice of cancellation with the State Board failed to
persuade the court of appeals to reverse. The court noted the following:
While
NCCI
tional
we do

Board rules requiring documentation of certain matters with the
[National Council on Compensation Insurance] do require addiaction on the part of a workers' compensation insurance carrier,
not find, nor has appellant cited, any reason why Board Rule 126

should distinguish workers' compensation insurance law from principles

applicable to insurance law in general. Therefore, contrary to appellant's
argument, we do not agree that cancellation in compliance with O.C.G.A.
198. Id., 413 S.E.2d at 739.

199. King v. Piedmont-Warner Dev., 177 Ga: App. 176, 338 S.E.2d 758 (1985).
200. 200 Ga. App. 278, 407 S.E.2d 775 (1991).
201, Id. at 278, 407 S.E.2d at 776.
202. Id. at 280-81, 407 S.E.2d at 777-78.
203. Id. at 280, 407 S.E.2d at 778.
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§ 33-24-44(b) and Board Rule 126, regardless of other circumstances surrounding the cancellation, automatically entitles a workers' compensation insurer to complete relief
against a claim that the cancellation was
04
not effective or applicable.2
Travelers was involved in yet another coverage question case during the
survey period, but this time enjoyed success.2 0 5 Travelers was the insurance carrier for Winkler Sign Company, a Tennessee employer. Winkler
came to Georgia to erect a sign for Granny's of Atlanta. In doing so, one
of its employees suffered catastrophic injuries. The employee not only
successfully applied for workers' compensation benefits in Tennessee, but
he filed a tort claim against several defendants, including Granny's, which
netted him $360,000. Under Tennessee law, Travelers exercised its right
to subrogation and recovered $80,000 of the tort settlement. Thereafter,
the employee filed for workers' compensation benefits in Georgia against
Winkler with Travelers as the workers' compensation carrier, and
Granny's of Atlanta, Inc., as a statutory employer."'
The ALJ ruled that Travelers was responsible for payment of Georgia
workers' compensation income benefits, but was entitled to a credit
against any amounts paid under Tennessee law. The full Board affirmed
the award of the ALJ, but disallowed the credit on the grounds that at
the time of the accident, Georgia did not recognize subrogation.20 7 The
superior court affirmed, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that
there was no evidence to support the ALJ's finding that the policy issued
by Travelers to Winkler provided coverage for any benefits payable under
Georgia law."' The court held that under the doctrine of lex loci contractus, Tennessee law permitted the agreement befween Winkler and Travelers to limit coverage to benefits payable only under the Tennessee
Law.2 0 9 According to the court, this would not frustrate the public policy
of Georgia and, in fact, was "consonant with general public policy in
Georgia."""0 The court of appeals rejected the ALJ's suggestion that
Travelers may have committed fraud or deceit in stating that there was
no evidence whatsoever of such conduct in the record.2 1 ' As a result, the
court dismissed Travelers and allowed the employee to collect Georgia

204. Id. at 281, 407 S.E.2d at 778.
205. Travelers Ins. Co. v. McNabb, 201 Ga. App. 297, 410 S.E.2d 788 (1991).

206. Id. at 297-98, 410 S.E.2d at 789-90.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

298, 410 S.E.2d at
300, 410 S.E.2d at
300-01, 410 S.E.2d
301, 410 S.E.2d at
302-03, 410 S.E.2d

790.
792.
at 790.
793.
at 793-94.
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benefits against Granny's as his statutory employer under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-8.111
The court of appeals considered whether an employer was estopped to
deny that it was subject to the Act in Home v. Exum. 13 The employee
suffered an injury while in the course of his employment. Not only did
the employer pay the employee his regular weekly salary, but the employer reimbursed the employee for his medical treatment. At a hearing
before the Board, the ALJ found that the employer was a partnership
that had fewer than three employees, and, therefore, was not subject to
the Act. The full Board agreed, but the superior court reversed, holding
that the employer "had voluntarily elected to be bound by the Act by
paying the employee's salary and medical expenses and was estopped to
deny benefits. '2 1' The court of appeals disagreed, finding that the doc-

trine of equitable estoppel did not apply."' Estoppel is mutual, and because there was no evidence in the record that established that the partnership had ever told the employee or led him to believe that he was
covered by workers' compensation, one could not say that he did or failed
to do anything which prejudiced his position. The court noted:
To hold otherwise would not only be unfair to employers who find themselves in Horne's situation by blindsiding them when they were attempting to do the right thing by an injured employee, but would discourage
such employers from making voluntary payments in any case where they
were under no legal obligation to do o0.216
In Lumber Transport, Inc. v. InternationalIndemnity

Co.,2 17

the court

of appeals again reiterated that the Board "'is not a court authorized to
render judgments on contracts .

. since it merely determines the

amount of compensation and the time of payment in accordance with the
Act.' "218 One of Lumber Transport's employees, who was injured in Florida, filed a claim in that state. However, because the policy specifically
limited coverage to benefits paid under the Georgia Workers' Compensation Act, International Indemnity made payment under the laws of Georgia in the maximum amount of $155. The company refused to defend the
Florida claim, which proceeded to a hearing in which the claimant was
awarded $315 per week. International Indemnity thereafter terminated
212. Id. at 303-04, 410 S.E.2d at 794.
213. 204 Ga. App. 337, 419 S.E.2d 147 (1992).
214. Id. at 337, 419 S.E.2d at 148.
215. Id. at 338, 419 S.E.2d at 149.
216. Id. at 338-39, 419 S.E.2d at 149.
217. 203 Ga. App. 588, 417 S.E.2d 365 (1992).
218. Id. at 589, 417 S.E.2d at 366 (quoting Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Crowder, 123 Ga.
App. 469, 471, 181 S.E.2d 530, 532 (1971)).
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payment of benefits to the employee in Georgia, and Lumber Transport
commenced payment of benefits under Florida law.2 '
Lumber Transport filed suit against International Indemnity in the Superior Court of Dekalb County seeking reimbursement for the Florida
benefits. Despite International Indemnity's protestations, the superior
court asserted jurisdiction on the grounds that this was a contract dispute, not a workers' compensation matter, and eventually rendered summary judgment in favor of International Indemnity, holding that it was
not obligated to pay benefits under Florida law because of the policy limitation. 20 In an eight to one decision, the court of appeals agreed, and
affirmed the decision.22' If the matter concerned the amount of payment
under Georgia law, or the timeliness of same, then jurisdiction would
have rested with the Board. However, in this case, even though the carrier
had voluntarily paid benefits under Georgia law, no party had ever filed a
claim in Georgia.
G. Dependency
In addition to involving issues of whether the accident arose out of and
in the course of employment, and assessed attorney fees, Goode Bros.
Poultry Co. v. Kin222 presented a third issue, a claim for benefits as a
dependent by the surviving spouse pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 34-913(b)(1). Both the ALJ and the full Board found that Mrs. Kin was totally dependent, as opposed to partial. 22' The superior court had affirmed
this finding, but the court of appeals reversed after a close examination of
the pertinent statute22 4 According to the court, "'if the surviving spouse
was employed for a period of 90 days next prior to the accident which
resulted in the death of the deceased employee, the presumption of total
dependence shall be rebuttable . . . .' "'2 Itwas undisputed that Mrs.
Kin was in fact employed during the ninety day period prior to her husband's death. Thus, she was not entitled to the conclusive presumption.
Because the evidence showed that she was employed full-time, and that
she and her adult children "made regular and substantial contributions
toward.payment of the household expenses," there only could be a finding
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id. at 558, 417 S.E.2d at 366.
Id. at 589, 417 S.E.2d at 366.
Id. at 588, 417 S.E.2d at 365.
201 Ga. App. 557, 411 S.E.2d 724 (1991).
Id. at 559, 411 S.E.2d at 726.
Id. at 557, 411 S.E.2d at 728.
Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 34-9-13(b)(11) (1992) (emphasis supplied by court)).
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of partial dependency. 26 The court reversed the case on this issue and
remanded to the full Board for entry of a new award.2 2
H.

Exclusive Remedy

The exclusive remedy provision of the Act provides that if employees
suffer a compensable work-related injury, their rights and remedies are
limited to those found in the Act.2 28 However, because of the limited benefits available under the Act, particularly no punitive damages, parties
continue to file tort claims, often using creative allegations in an attempt
to avoid coverage. The case of Bryant v: Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.2 2 sets
forth a good example. Bryant, an employee on Wal-Mart's night crew,
was locked in the store for security reasons. Sha suffered a stroke, and
because emergency medical personnel were unable to reach her in time,
she died. The administrator of her estate filed a tort claim alleging,
among other things, that not only was the injury caused by wilful and
intentional conduct, false imprisonment, but that the employer was guilty
of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") violations
under O.C.G.A. section 16-4-4(a).230 Both the superior court and the court
of appeals rejected these contentions, noting once again that the Act precluded recovery "'for wilful or intentional acts of the employer so long as
the injury arises out of and in the course of employment.' ""1 The Act
precluded recovery in this case because it was undisputed that Bryant
was locked in the store for business purposes, that she was engaged in
the performance of her work duties at the time she suffered the stroke
and that the emergency crew was unable to render immediate assistance
to the deceased due to the delay in gaining entrance to the store. "
With regard to the allegation that the employer was guilty of a RICO
violation, the court found that there was nothing in the language of this
statute or the Act to suggest that the legislature intended such a violation
2 3
to supersede the exclusive remedy provision. 3
Not only does the exclusive remedy provisioi protect the employer
from a tort action by its employees, but it may protect the employer from
third party lawsuits as well. This is exactly what occurred in Georgia De226. Id.
227. Id. at 561, 411 S.E.2d at 728.
228. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11 (1992).
229. 203 Ga. App. 770, 417 S.E.2d 688 (1992).
230. Id. at 770-71, 417 S.E.2d at 690-91.
231. Id. at 771, 417 S.E.2d at 690 (quoting Superb Carpet Mills v. Thomason, 183 Ga.
App. 554, 556, 359 S.E.2d 370, 372 (1987)).
232. Id., 417 S.E.2d at 691.
233. Id. at 772, 417 S.E.2d at 691.
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partment of Human Resources v. Joseph Campbell Co.2 34 A Campbell
employee suffered radiation burns while using a fluoroscopic machine.
She received workers' compensation benefits from her employer, and later
sued-the Department of Human Resources ("DHR") and its inspector for
negligent inspection. DHR filed a third party complaint against Campbell, alleging that its intentional violation of state regulations entitled
DHR to contribution and indemnity. The Superior Court of Gwinnett
County held that Campbell was immune from liability because of its payment of workers' compensation benefits to Gibson. 35 On appeal, DHR
argued that the exclusive remedy provision should not apply in those instances in which a "passive tortfeasor has a claim for implied indemnity
against an employer whose active negligence primarily caused the employee's injuries. ' 3M The court of appeals rejected this argument, agreeing
with the superior court that Campbell was immune from liability after
having paid workers' compensation benefits.2 3 7 The court refused to permit DHR's claim of implied indemnity as a joint tortfeasor, holding that
when the relation between the parties does not spring from a contract or
special position such as a bailee or lessee, the third party cannot recover
indemnity from the employer, since an active or primary wrongdoer does
not have an implied obligation, capable of penetrating the exclusiveness
rule of workmen's compensation law, to indemnify a passive or secondary
tortfeasor.3 8
However, the court was quick to point out that the Act did not prevent a
defendant from seeking indemnification based on a contract.23 9
Once again, in Sargent v. Blankmann,2'0 the court of appeals held that
when the accident arises out of and in the course of employment, the
exclusive remedy provision bars tort actions between co-employees. 2 4' On
September 26, 1988, Sargent and Bohan, both employees of the Georgia
Department of Human Resources, left Atlanta to attend to a work-related
meeting in Dahlonega, Georgia. On the way to the meeting they were in
an automobile accident in which Bohan suffered fatal injuries. Bohan's
children thereafter filed a tort claim against Sargent, which the court de24 2
termined was barred by the exclusive remedy provision.
234. 261 Ga. 822, 411 S.E.2d 871 (1992).
235. Id. at 822, 411 S.E.2d at 872-73.
236. Id., 411 S.E.2d at 872.
237. Id. at 823, 411 S.E.2d at 873.
238. Id. (quoting ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 76.20 (Desk
ed. 1990)).
239. Id.
240. 202 Ga. App. 156, 413 S.E.2d 495 (1991).
241. Id. at 157, 413 S.E.2d at 496.
242. Id. at 156-57, 413 S.E.2d at 495-96.
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Indemnity Benefits

In Liberty National Life Insurance Co. v. Coley,2" 8 the issue was
whether the employee had received timely payment of a settlement in the
amount of $125,000. The settlement had been approved by the Board on
December 5, 1989. At that time, Georgia law required that the claimant
actually receive payment within twenty days. 2 " On December 21, the
third-party administrator for payment of the benefits mailed two settlement checks by United Parcel Service Next Day.Air to Liberty's attorney
in Savannah, Georgia for forwarding to the employee's attorney in St.
Mary's, Georgia. Liberty's attorneys personally delivered the checks to a
Federal Express office, and Federal Express personnel assured them that
they would deliver the letters to the employee's attorney the following
day, Saturday, December 23, 1989. Liberty's attorneys used express mail
because of an approaching winter storm. Unfortunately, this method
proved ineffective because the roads to St. Mary's had been closed.246
The employee finally received the checks- on December 26 at approximately 4:06 p.m., which was considered the twentieth day because of the
holiday the day before. Nevertheless, the employee filed for a hearing
with the Board seeking an additional $25,000, arguing that she received
the checks so late in the day that she was unable to negotiate them and,
therefore, was entitled to a statutory penalty. The Board agreed with the
employee and assessed a $25,000 penalty.246 However, the court of appeals reversed, noting that although there was precedent requiring that
an employee receive benefits within twenty days of an award, there was
"no express or implied determination that receipt of negotiable instruments, which [was] an acceptable method of payment," was not effective
until actual negotiation.2417 According to the court, "[riequiring the payor
to calculate into the 20 day payment period such factors as weather prognosis, banking hours and regulations, and the claimant's or attorney's cooperation in negotiating the instruments within the allocated time frame,
defies reason and equity and effectively shortens the period the statute
specifies. '248 It is ironic that the employer was forced to litigate the matter all the way to the court of appeals to obtain this decision.
In Transus, Inc. v. Fleck,24' 9 the court of appeals considered an employee's ability to recoup an advance. Fleck, who was injured in 1985,

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

201 Ga. App. 623, 411 S.E.2d 553 (1991).
Id. at 624, 411 S.E.2d at 554.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 625, 411 S.E.2d at 555.
Id. (emphasis added).
204 Ga. App. 306, 418 S.E.2d 817 (1992).
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received a total of $15,000 in two separate advances, the first occurring on
June 10, 1987, and the second occurring December 9, 1987. Both awards
permitted the employer to take credit against payment of permanent partial disability benefits that might become due at a later date under
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-263. In 1988, the employer became aware that
Fleck was permanently and totally disabled and, thus, no permanent partial disability rating would be assessed. The employer then moved for reduction of Fleck's weekly benefits in order to recoup the advances.150
After a hearing in which most of, the evidence was submitted by stipulation, the ALJ ordered the carrier to reduce income benefits by $50 per
week. On de novo review, the full Board decided that since the employee
did not appeal the awards of June 10, 1987 or December 9, 1987, the employer's ability to take credit would be limited to any permanent partial
disability benefits that might become due.2" Thus, the full Board reversed the ALJ's decision on the grounds that the prior awards were res
judicata with respect to the method of repayment.126 The court of appeals
reversed, holding that there was no evidence that the question of Fleck's
permanent total disability could have been addressed at the time of the
advances 258 The language in the awards that the employer could take
credit by reducing permanent partial disability merely reflected an "anticipated" means of repayment. The court held this would not be a substantive bar to recoupment if the anticipated permanent partial disability
status did not materialize, and to "conclude otherwise would work an injustice on. the employer/self-insurer who has provided additional assistance to claimant by virtue of the advances."" '4
When a settlement agreement designates beneficiaries in the event of
the death of the employee, the courts do not consider the monies to be
part of the estate, and the estate shall pay the beneficiaries with no deduction for year's support. ' 6" In King v. Travelers Insurance Co.,' "" the
employee was to receive $850 per month for life, guaranteed for sixteen
years. If he died within sixteen years, the remaining monthly payments
were payable to his designated beneficiaries. Upon the employee's death,
which came well within the sixteen year period, his common law wife applied for year's support through the probate court, which the court
granted. She then sought to enforce the order in the superior court, but
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
proper
255.
256.

Id. at 306, 418 S.E.2d at 817-18.
Id., 418 S.E.2d at 818.
Id.
Id. at 307, 418 S.E.2d at 818-19.
Id. at 308, 418 S.E.2d at 819. The court also questioned whether it was procedurally
for the Board to consult its own files, which were not in evidence. Id.
King v. Travelers Ins. Co., 202 Ga. App. 568, 415 S.E.2d 176 (1992).
202 Ga. App. 568, 415 S.E.2d 176 (1992).
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that court dismissed the suit upon the insurance carrier's motion.'! The
court of appeals agreed, likening the monthly payments under the settlement to proceeds of a life insurance policy that vest in the named beneficiary and, therefore, are not part of the decedent's estate, which is subject
to year's support.21

J.

Medical Benefits

If practitioners have taken anything for granted over the years in the
workers' compensation area, it is that once physicians become authorized,
then they may automatically authorize a subsequent physician by making
a referral. Two decisions during the survey period prove that this may not
have been the case after all. In Brown v. TransamericaIMS," 9 the employee was referred to 'apsychologist by his authorized treating physician.
The employer apparently did not like this medical provider, and instead
chose another psychologist who was treating his mother-in-law. The original physician then referred Brown to the second psychologist, but within
a month told him that he was revoking the referral and, would be sending
him to a third psychologist. The employer/insurer, having initially paid
visits, filed a notice to controvert as of the
for the second psychologist's
0
date of the revocation.2
The ALJ sided with the employer, finding that the employer was not
responsible for the unpaid medical bills of the second psychologist on two
grounds. First, the basis for the referral originated with the employee
himself, and second, the authorized treating physician had revoked it.
The full Board affirmed.' 1 On appeal, the superior court rejected the
ALJ's reasoning that the referral was invalid because it originated with
the employee, but sided with the ALJ,holding that the authorized physician had the authority to revoke the referral if based on "sound and reasonable discretion of the employer-selected physician.'

"

The court re-

manded the case for determination of the reason for the revocation,
2
which led to this appeal.

3

The court of appeals, in an interesting opinion, held that under a prior
decision from the Georgia Supreme Court construing O.C.G.A. section 349-201, "only parties who change physicians and/or treatment with Board
approval have their respective interests protected under the Workers'
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id. at 569, 415 S.E.2d at 177..
Id., 415 S.E.2d at 177-78.
200 Ga. App. 272, 407 S.E.2d 430 (1991).
Id. at 272, 407 S.E.2d at 431.
Id. at 273, 407 S.E.2d at 431.
Id., 407 S.E.2d at 432.
Id.
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Compensation Act." 2

4

This was the case despite the fact that O.C.G.A.

section 34-9-201(c) provides in part that "[t]he physicians selected under
this subsection may arrange for any consultation, referral,and extraordinary or other specialized medical services as the nature of the injury shall
require."'12 " However, because the employer had paid a portion of the fees
generated by the second psychologist, the court determined that the employer had acquiesced and, therefore, could not controvert his treatment
as being unauthorized."
In a later case, Lee Fabricatorsv. Cook,267 the court of appeals expounded on its earlier decision as set forth in Brown.268 Cook, an employee of Lee Fabricators, injured her lower back. An employer-provided
physician, Dr. Watts, treated her and then, at the request of the employee, referred her to another physician, Dr. Powell. Dr. Powell thereafter referred Cook for psychological and psychiatric treatment, which included hospitalization. Lee Fabricators controverted payment for the
psychiatric treatment.'
The ALJ awarded payment for prior psychiatric care, including a diet
program, but denied payment for future psychiatric treatment because it
would be duplicative. The full Board affirmed the ALJ's award in part,
but denied, payment for the diet program. 70 The superior court, however,
reversed the denial of payment for future psychiatric care, holding "that
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200(b) did not authorize the Board to order a unilateral
change in treatment."2 7 The court of appeals, referring to its recent decision in Brown, once again warned that when parties disregard the procedure set forth in O.C.G.A. section 34-9-201(b) throtigh (d), "they assume
the risk of acting without Board approval and are bound by the consequence of their actions."" Similar to the employer in Brown, the employer/insurer acquiesced with regard to Dr. Powell by making payment
to him. Thus, he was authorized and entitled to payment. As for the psychiatric care, the Board made no payment and had authorized no change
of physicians. Therefore, the ALJ properly denied liability for future psychiatric care.273
264. Id. at 275, 407 S.E.2d at 433 (citing Holcombe v. Brown Transport Corp., 253 Ga.
719, 324 S.E.2d 446 (1985)).
265. See O.C.G.A. § 34-9-201(c) (1992) (emphasis added).
266. 200 Ga. App. at 275, 407 S.E.2d at 433.
267. 203 Ga. App. 450, 417 S.E.2d 35 (1992).
268. See Brown v. Transamerica IMS, 200 Ga. App. 272, 407 S.E.2d 430 (1991).
269. 203 Ga. App. at 450, 417 S.E.2d at 35-36.
270. Id., 417 S.E.2d at 36.
271. Id., 417 S.E.2d at 36.
272. Id. at 451, 417 S.E.2d at 36.
273. Id. at 451-52, 417 S.E.2d at 36-37.
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Realizing that employees would inundate the Board with requests for

.change of physicians, the Board promulgated a new rule effective July 1,
1992.274 Board Rule 201(c) now provides that "[a] referral by an authorized treating physician made pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 34-9-201(c) for the
specific purpose of consultation, evaluation, testing, or diagnosis in connection with treatment prescribed by the authorized treating physician
does not constitute a change of physician or treatment and does not require an order from the Board. '' 175 Whether the courts will uphold this if

attacked on .the grounds that it exceeds the Board's authority remains to
be seen.
In Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Champion,'76 the court of appeals again considered the issue of an authorized medical provider, but in the ensuing
decision the court made no reference to either Brown or Cook. In Champion the claimant suffered a compensable, on-the-job injury. She received
treatment from a physician on the posted panel for physical injuries and
was thereafter referred to Dr. Garrett, a psychiatrist, who performed an
independent medical evaluation but did not treat.27 7 The orthopedic surgeon that had been treating Champion, Dr. Loughlin, could find nothing
wrong with her, and dismissed her from treatment. Thereafter, and in
June 1987, Champion obtained unapproved treatment from a medical
clinic that in turn referred her to a psychologist, Dr. George, who began
to see her in April 1988. Dr. George in turn referred her to a psychiatrist,
Dr. Cheatham, who Champion initially saw in September 1988. Prior to
these referrals, however, and in November 1987, Dr. McCloud, an orthopedist, had seen Champion and was providing ongoing medical
treatment.

76

In January 1989, the employer agreed to pay for all of the prior medical
expenses incurred by Champion, including those from the unapproved
medical providers, in exchange for her agreement that Dr. McCloud
would be the authorized treating physician and that the employer would
not be responsible for additional charges by the other medical providers.
One month later she ceased working, and on March 7, 1989 she entered
Brawner Psychiatric Institute where she remained hospitalized for two
months because of depression and suicidal ideations. Despite her earlier
agreement, s Champion also continued her treatment with Dr.
Cheatham.27

274.

GA. BD. oF WORKERS' COMPENSATION R. 201 (O.C.G.A. tit. 34 (1992)).

275. Id. 201(c) (emphasis added).
276.
277.

203 Ga. App. 736, 417 S.E.2d 703, (1992).
Id. at 737, 417 S.E.2d at 704.

278. Id.
279.

Id. at 737-38, 417 S.E.2d at 704..
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Champion sought reimbursement for all of her medical expenses incurred through Dr. George, Dr. Cheatham, and Brawner Psychiatric Institute after January 1, 1989. The ALJ denied her claim for reimbursement,
finding that although Champion may have been able to seek treatment on
her own at one point because of a complete dismissal by the initial authorized treating physician, Dr. Loughlin, she relinquished this right
when she agreed that Dr. McCloud would be the authorized physician in
January 1989. Not only did the ALJ reject Champion's claim that she
misunderstood that she was authorized to receive treatment from Dr.
McCloud, but he also rejected the contention that the psychiatric hospitalization at Brawner constituted an emergency. 80 The superior court reversed in part, finding that the employer "failed in its obligation to provide mental health services" and, therefore, Drs. George and Cheatham
were authorized. 81 Additionally, the superior court found that Dr.
McCloud had "implicitly" authorized Drs. Cheatham and George, and
that "the ALJ erred as a matter of law in finding that the psychiatric
hospitalization did not qualify as a medical emergency." 8 22
The court of appeals reversed the superior court and held that there
was no evidence in the record of any referral by Dr: McCloud after January 1, 1989.283 Furthermore, the court of appeals pointed to statements in
the record implying that the parties had agreed that the authorized treating physician would be Dr. McCloud. There was no evidence that Dr.
McCloud ever discharged Champion and, in fact, she even testified that
she failed to go back to him. As for the ALJ's finding that there was no
"emergency," this was a question of fact, and the superior court was without authority to reverse.2 8 4 Although the holding in Champion can be
read consistently with the court's earlier decisions in Brown and Cook,
the decision nevertheless should be taken as a warning to practitioners
that if the parties agree on a change of medical providers, they should
obtain Board approval.
With medical costs skyrocketing, group carriers and other medical
providers are not only attempting to put a cap on expenses but are also
trying to find ways to recover costs. The recovery of costs was at issue in
Tolleson Lumber Co. v. Kirk.'85 The question before the court was
whether a personal injury protection ("PIP") carrier could seek reimbursement for medical expenses paid to an employee by filing against the
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Id. at 738, 417 S.E.2d at 704.
Id. at 739, 417 S.E.2d at 705.
Id.
Id.
Id.
200 Ga. App. 689, 409 S.E.2d 260 (1991).
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workers' compensation carrier. 2 " The court of appeals answered in the
affirmative and held that O.C.G.A. section 34-9-206 was not limited to
group health carriers.1 7 The section specifically states that it applies not
only to group companies, but to any "other health care provider who covers the cost of medical treatment for a person who subsequently files a
2
claim under this chapter." 11

K. Misrepresentation
In Red Roof Inn v. Lynn,2 " the court continued the development of the
so-called "Rycroft" defense, which has evolved since the supreme court's
decision in Georgia Electric Co. v. Rycroft.20 In Lynn the court found
that medical evidence that an individual who previously experienced recurrent back pain is at an increased risk of having the same type of injury
was insufficient, by itself, to establish a causal connection between a concealed pre-existing back condition and a subsequent back injury.2 9' The
evidence was offered at a medical deposition at which it was further established that the physician was unaware of the specifics of the claimant's
pre-existing back problems, and could not testify whether the claimant's
current condition was even at the same location of the spine as the preexisting problem.2 2 Under these circumstances, the court determined
that the evidence was insufficient to establish the causal connection re2 93
quired by the decision in Rycroft.
Although the case was reversed and remanded on other grounds, the
court's comments on the "Rycroft" issue are significant in that they are
the first attempt by a Georgia appellate court to define what constitutes a
sufficient causal connection between a misrepresentation in the employment process and a subsequent on-the-job injury. While the facts surrounding the physician's opinion in this case are somewhat unusual, in
that the physician clearly was unaware of the specifics of the claimant's
pre-existing problems, the court seems to indicate that a causal connection would at least require the subsequent injury to be at the same location of the spine as the concealed, pre-existing condition.
286. Id. at 689, 409 S.E.2d at 261.
287. Id. at 691, 409 S.E.2d at 262.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-206 (1992).
203 Ga. App. 38, 416 S.E.2d 307 (1992).
259 Ga. 155, 378 S.E.2d 111 (1989).
203 Ga. App. at 40, 416 S.E.2d at 309.
Id.
Id.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION,

1992]
L. Notice

Georgia's appellate courts have always liberally interpreted the notice
requirement of O.C.G.A. section 34-9-80, which requires that an injured
employee notify the employer of the occurrence of an on-the-job accident
within thirty days.2 9 4 This trend continued in Impress Communications,
2 5
Inc. v. Stanley.
Prior to going to work for Impress Communications in 1987, Stanley
had a long history of back problems. She complained openly of back pain
while working for Impress. Her job with the company required lifting and
emptying five gallon buckets of water. The claimant contended that in
January 1989 she began experiencing intense pain in her back. She mentioned to the president of the company that it was a good thing the company was planning to fix a machine she worked on because "her back was
about to give out." 2 6 About one week later, a chiropractor treated the
claimant for what the chiropractor described as a gradual onset of lower
back pain. When the claimant returned to the chiropractor for subsequent treatment, her husband telephoned her supervisor and stated his
wife "needed bed rest and would not report to work for a couple of
days."2 9 7 Several days later, the claimant reported to work in a back
brace, which both her supervisor and the company president observed.
The claimant only worked a few days, and then physicians diagnosed her
having a herniated disc, which required surgery. Throughout the progression of her back pain, the claimant never orally, nor in writing, advised
her employer that her back problems were in any way related to her job.
When she filled out an application for group insurance coverage of her
medical bills, the claimant placed a question mark in the space that asked
if her injury was work-related, and made a similar response on a physical
therapy questionnaire." When the carrier denied her application for
group insurance, both her chiropractor and her orthopedic surgeon provided statements that they had no reason to conclude her back problems
were work-related. On May 1, 1989, the group carrier informed her employer that the claimant was contending, for the first time, that her injury
was work-related. 2 9'
The Board determined that the claimant's back problems were the result of her work activities over a two year period for Impress Communications. The Board rejected the employer's notice defense on the grounds

294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-80 (1992).
202 Ga. App. 226, 414 S.E,2d 238 (1991).
Id.at 227, 414 S.E.2d at 238.
Id., 414 S.E.2d at 239.
Id.
Id. at 227-28, 414 S.E.2d at 239.
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that the claimant's original statement to the company president regarding
the fixing of her machine was sufficient to constitute "legal notice" under
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-80.3o0 The court of appeals affirmed, citing the now
faxniliar rule that the required notice under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-80 "is
sufficient if it puts the employer on notice of the injury so that it may
make an investigation if it sees fit to do so. '8301The employer, however,

contended that it did not have a duty to investigate given the claimant's
repeated assertions throughout her claim for group disability benefits
that her problems were not ' work-related.8 02 The court rejected the employer's argument, however, finding that as of the date the claimant
ceased work the employer "had specific knowledge of the toll claimant's
work was taking on her back." 0 3 The court held this was sufficient to
allow the employer to investigate further, if it saw fit to do so8 0 ' Moreover, the court found that the claimant's statements that her injury was
not work-related did not preclude recovery because her responses left
open the possibility that the injury might have been job-related.8 5
The court in Stanley goes further than in previous cases interpreting
the notice requirement because it concerned a claimant who made affirmative representations that the alleged injury was not work-related. Given
the court's sensitivity to barring workers' compensation benefits on the
technical grounds of notice, employers asserting this defense will have to
do more than merely assert that the claimant did not allege her condition
to be work-related. Employers asserting the notice defense also should
demonstrate that their ability to investigate the case was prejudiced.
M. Procedure
The court of appeals issued a number of significant decisions in the
survey period affecting workers' compensation procedure, specifically appeals, trial evidence, and the proper form to address setting aside a State
Board decision on the basis of fraud.
Appeals. O.C.G.A. section 34-9-105(b) contains the statutory authority for appealing a decision of the Board to the superior court of the
county in which the injury occurred.306 In Fasher Painting& Decorating
300. Id. at 228, 414 S.E.2d at 239.
301. Id., 414 S.E.2d at 239-40 (quoting Harper v. L&M Granite Co., 197 Ga. App. 157,
158, 397 S.E.2d 739, 741 (1990)).
302. Id. at 228-29, 414 S.E.2d at 240.
303. Id. at 229, 414 S.E.2d at 240.
304. - Id.
305. Id.
306. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105 (1992).
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Co. v. Bordelon, 0 7 the issue presented was whether a party may directly
appeal anything other than a final award of compensation benefits to a
superior court. In Bordelon the Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool
("GIIP") made a motion before the ALJ "to add American Policyholders'
Insurance Company ("APIC") as a party defendant in regard to hearing
'to determine the proper party for the handling of claimant's workers'
compensation benefits.' "8081 When the ALJ denied this motion, GIIP appealed, and the full Board reversed, ordering that APIC be added as a
party defendant. APIC appealed to the superior court, which reversed3 0
The court of appeals held that since the full Board's decision to add
APIC as a party defendant was not a final decision granting or denying
compensation, it was not the proper subject of an appeal to the superior
court 8 10 The court interpreted O.C.G.A. section 34-9-105(b) to mean that
only final awards of compensation may be appealed, as opposed to final
orders or judgments dealing with anything other than compensation, such
as adding or deleting parties3 1I Addressing appellee's argument that such
a ruling would leave the Board free to exceed its statutory authority on
such issues, the court of appeals responded that it would not assume that
the Board would breach its inherent duty of good faith in applying the
law, and further stated that this was a problem for the legislature to address, rather than the courts. 2 Although the-court regarded the language
of O.C.G.A. section 34-9-105(b) as "unambiguously" 8 1 prescribing appeals only from a final award of compensation, the statute's wording allows for appeals of any "final award or . . . of any other final order or
judgment of the members of the board." 14 The statute is not clear if only
final awards providing actual benefits may be appealed, but as the court
pointed out, this has been the interpretation placed on the statute previously.8 18 Moreover, this interpretation would seem to be consistent with
the well-established policy in workers' compensation of promoting swift
resolution of workers' compensation disputes. 1 Certainly, the litigation
of a workers' compensation case would be slowed if an employee could
appeal every order of the Board, whether the order related to compensa-

307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
(1980);

204 Ga. App. 196, 419 S.E.2d 82 (1992).
Id. at 196, 419 S.E.2d at 83.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 197, 419 S.E.2d at 83-84.
Id. at 196, 419 S.E.2d at 83.
Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(b) (1992)).
Id. (citing Conwood Corp. v. Guinn, 190 Ga. App. 595, 379 S.E.2d 621 (1991)).
See Denis Aerial Ag-Plicators, Inc. v. Swift, 154 Ga. App. 742, 269 S.E.2d 890
Continental Casualty Co. v. Caldwell, 55 Ga. App. 17, 189 S.E. 408 (1936).
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tion benefits or not. Presumably, an employee may include any errors in
such decisions in appeals once the Board makes a final award of benefits.
The court more narrowly construed, however, the Board's discretion
with regard to arguments advanced by parties through briefs. In TimesGeorgian v. Thompson,1 7 the claimant appealed a decision by the ALJ,
which denied his disability benefits. While the claimant did not file a
brief within twenty days of the date of her appeal, as required by Board
Rule 103(b)(1), she did file a brief at the Board on the date oral argument
was held before the members of the full Board. Although the claimant's
brief was stamped filed on the date of the oral argument, the employer
objected to the untimely filing, and the Board ruled at the oral argument
that it would not consider the claimant's brief. At the Board's direction,
the words "filed late, not considered" were handwritten on the face of the
brief. Nevertheless, in its reversal of the ALJ's decision the full Board
specifically referred to the claimant's brief.918
The court of appeals ruled that although the full Board would have
been within its discretion to allow the late filing of an appellate brief, its
failure to allow a responsive brief by the employer denied the employer
its fundamental due process rights.3 1 9 The court noted that Rule 103
grants an appellee the right to respond to the appellant's brief, and that
under the circumstances, it could not be said that the failure to allow the
employer to do so was harmless.32 0 The court of appeals did not reverse
the entire decision of the full Board, but remanded the3 case and ordered
that the employer be allowed to file a responsive brief. 21
Trial Procedure. As the trier of fact, the Board is given broad discre3 22
tion to determine factual issues, including the credibility of witnesses.
As the court of appeals held in David Jordan Logging Co. v. Sales, 23
however, this discretion is not without limits.3 2' In Sales the employer
defended against the claimant's allegations of disability, contending that
the claimant was malingering for workers' compensation benefits and was
not actually injured. As a part of the employer's defense, the employer
attempted to introduce evidence concerning a sizeable IRS tax lien filed
against Sales, arguing that since workers' compensation benefits are not
317. 201 Ga. App. 854, 412 S.E.2d 871 (1991).
318. Id. at 854-55, 412 S.E.2d at 872.
319. Id. at 855, 412 S.E.2d at 873.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 856, 412 S.E.2d at 874.
322. See O.C.G.A. § 34-9-100(a) (1992); Cobb Gen. Hosp. v. Burrell, 174 Ga. App. 631,
331 S.E.2d 23 (1985); Horton v. Georgia Power Co., 164 Ga. App. 252, 296 S.E.2d 798 (1982);
Williams v. Bennett, 162 Ga. App. 850, 292 S.E.2d 521 (1982).
323. 203 Ga. App. 410, 416 S.E.2d 803 (1992).
324. Id. at 411-12, 416 S.E.2d at 805.
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subject to such a lien, Sales was motivated to remain on workers' compensation benefits.24 The ALJ refused to allow the employer to cross examine the claimant on this issue, and the court of appeals reversed. 2 6
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-102(e)(1) provides that workers' compensation
hearings shall be conducted "in an informal manner consistent with the
requirements of due process ....

A party may conduct such cross exam-

ination as required for a full and true disclosure of the facts."' 7 Noting
that workers' compensation hearings are subject to the same rules of evidence that apply to civil proceedings, the court of appeafs held that the
"thorough and sifting cross-examination" requirements of O.C.G.A. section 24-9-64 apply.2 ' Finding that evidence concerning the claimant's
motivation for malingering was relevant to the claimant's defense, the
court held that the ALJ erred in both excluding this evidence and prohibiting the employer from cross-examining the claimant on this subject.2
In Red Roof Inn v. Lynn,'30 the court of appeals also reversed a decision in which a post-hearing doctor's deposition was excluded. 81 The ALJ
allowed the record to remain open for thirty days following the hearing
based upon the employer's request to depose two physicians, Drs. Lievano
and Kahn. After taking Dr. Kahn's deposition, however, the employer's
counsel advised claimant's counsel that he did not intend to depose Dr.
Lievano. Claimant's counsel responded by moving to exclude the deposition of Dr. Kahn, which the ALJ granted on the grounds that the record
had been left open primarily for taking Dr. Lievano's deposition, and not
for the employer's counsel subsequently to decide which of the two depo82
sitions would be taken.
The court of appeals reversed. 8 8 The court noted that the ALJ did not
indicate at the time he allowed the record to remain open that the right
to submit either of the doctor's depositions would be contingent on the
taking of the other.83 ' The court also noted that there was no authority
requiring that a party to an adversarial proceeding be required to introduce evidence against his will.3 5 Finding that Kahn's testimony may have
caused a different result, the court of appeals vacated the Board's award
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.

Id. at. 411, 416 S.E.2d at 804.
Id. at 412, 416 S.E.2d at 805.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-102(e)(1) (1992).
203 Ga. App. at 411, 416 S.E.2d at 805.
Id. at 412, 416 S.E.2d at 805.
203 Ga. App. 38, 416 S.E.2d 307 (1992).
Id. at 39, 416 S.E.2d at 309.
Id. at 38-39, 416 S.E.2d at 308.
Id.at 39, 416 S.E.2d at 309.
Id., 416 S.E.2d at 308.
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and ordered the case remanded for consideration of Dr. Kahn's
3
deposition.

Proper Forum for Vacating Award on Basis of Fraud. Two
cases during the survey period dealt with the difficult procedural question
of how to vacate a final award of the Board when the Board later discoversInthat
the awards were procured on the
of fraud.
Griggs
v. All-Steel Buildings, Inc.,8 7 basis
a steel beam struck the claimant in the face during the course of his employment with All-Steel Buildings, Inc., causing a major head injury. As a result, the claimant suffered
severe cognitive and behavioral disorders, and his physician strongly recommended that he be placed in a structured rehabilitative program.88
Although these and other reports were available to the employer and its
workers' compensation carrier, "the insurer began settlement negotiations
with the claimant, who was not represented by counsel. ' '8

9

An agreement

was reached in which, in exchange for a release from liability, the claimant agreed to accept the lump sum of $30,000 and $750 per month for
twenty-four months. The insurer also agreed to pay past medical expenses, but limited payment for future medical expenses and the costs
associated with vocational rehabilitation to those expenses incurred
within the next twelve months after approval of the settlement. The parties submitted the settlement agreement to the Board, who subsequently
approved it pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 34-9-15.40

Nearly a year later, the claimant, through his mother acting as next
friend, filed a request for hearing with the Board, alleging that the employer/insurer failed to provide vocational rehabilitation as required by
the settlement agreement. "Subsequently, the claimant filed a motion to
set aside the settlement agreement .
competent to have entered into it. '1

on the grounds that he was inBefore the Board heard the case,

. .

however, the employer/insurer petitioned the superior court, and obtained a judgment on the prior settlement award pursuant to O.C.G.A.
section 34-9-106. The ALJ concluded that the Board no longer had jurisdiction of the case, "by virtue of the superior court's judgment and ordered the proceedings before the [B]oard stayed until the superior court
could determine if it had jurisdiction in the matter. 8 342 The claimant filed
a separate motion to set aside in the superior court, which was denied on
336. Id., 416 S.E.2d at 309.
337. 201 Ga. App. 111, 410 S.E.2d 309 (1991).

338. Id. at 111-12, 410 S.E.2d at 310.
339. Id. at 112, 410 S.E.2d at 310.
340. Id.

341. Id.
342. Id.
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the ground that the
record before the court was insufficient to justify the
3 43
claimant's motion.

After an initial decision and a subsequent motion for reconsideration,
the court of appeals framed the issue before it as determining which forum a claimant in a workers' compensation action must use to bring a
motion to set aside a prior, final award of compensation. 344 The court
then held that the superior court erred "in denying claimant's motion to
set aside the award without first permitting the parties to submit evidence relating to the motion and conducting a hearing on the merits."34' 5
The court considered the claimant's motion to set aside on the ground of
incompetency tantamount to a motion to set aside on the ground of fraud
in the procurement of the settlement, since the allegation was that the
employer was aware of his incompetency at the time the settlement
agreement was executed.3 46 Although the Board is without statutory3 47authority to review a final award or settlement on the grounds of fraud,

it

has long been the law that even a binding award based on an agreement
parties may be set aside on the grounds of fraud, accident, or
between3 the
48
mistake.

The court then took up the difficult task of tracing a long-standing
right in equity to challenge the judgment of a court based upon fraud
through a series of repealed statutes. Former Georgia Code Annotated
section 37-219 was the original statute providing for setting aside awards
through an action in equity 3 49 The court noted that when the legislature
repealed the statute, the action transferred to O.C.G.A. section 9-11-60(e)
as the statute for challenging judgments on the ground of fraud, accident,
or mistake.3 10 However, the legislature amended O.C.G.A. section 9-11-60
to extinguish the complaint in equity, and instead provided that a party
may bring a motion to set aside on the ground of fraud, accident, or mistake only pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 9-11-60(d). The employer/insurer
argued that since the code section refers only to setting aside a "judgment," and not an award of the Board, the claimant was without remedy.351 The court rejected this argument, noting that awards of the Board
may be reduced to judgments pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 34-9-106, and
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
(1959)).
348.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 111, 410 S.E.2d at 310.
at 112-13, 410 S.E.2d at 311.
at 113, 410 S.E.2d at 311.
(citing Simpson v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 99 Ga. App. 629, 109 S.E.2d 876

Id.(citing Cardin v. Riegel Textile Corp., 217 Ga. 797, 125 S.E.2d 62 (1962)).
GA. CODE ANN. § 37-219 (Harrison 1979).
350. 201 Ga. App. at 113, 410 SE.2d at 311 (citing Russell v. Fast Framers, Inc., 164 Ga.
App. 771, 298 S.E.2d 303 (1982)).
351. Id.
349.
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that since this analysis had allowed complaints in equity under the original statutesa5 the same analysis still applies.353 In fact, as the court
pointed out, the employer/self-insurer had already obtained a judgment
based on the Board's decision from a superior court, and therefore an
action already'existed in the superior court.36
The effect of the decision in Griggs is to simply reestablish, following
the various amendments to O.C.G.A. section 9-11-60, that the proper procedure for setting aside a judgment of the Board based on allegations of
fraud is a motion to set aside in the superior court. The court reaffirmed
this holding in Hall & Sosebee Trucking Co. v. Smith." 5 The facts of
Hall were similar to Griggs in that the moving party was seeking to set
aside a final consent agreement filed with the Board. In Hall, however,
the employer was the one trying to undo a consent agreement in which it
agreed to pay workers' compensation benefits based upon allegations that
the claimant had obtained this agreement by making fraudulent representations regarding injury and disability.351 The employer filed a motion
with the superior court, denominated as a "complaint in equity," requesting the court to set aside the Board's award on the basis of fraud and
misrepresentation. The superior court dismissed the complaint as a claim
upon which relief could not be granted, and the court of appeals reversed
based upon -its earlier decision in Griggs.3 57 The court further considered,
however, the claimant's argument that the employer knew or should have
known of the alleged fraud in time to have raised it by direct appeal of
the Board's decision under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-105. 1The court of appeals noted that if, in fact, the employer knew or should have known of
the alleged fraud in time to file a direct appeal, then the motion in equity
should be dismissed; however, the record was insufficient to make this
determination.59 The case was therefore reversed, and remanded to the
superior court for further consideration.'"
352. Id. (citing Heath v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 94 Ga. App. 548, 95 S.E.2d 726
(1956)).
353. Id. at 114, 410 S.E.2d at 311.
354.

Id.

355.
356.

201 Ga. App. 282, 283, 410 S.E.2d 784, 785 (1991).
Id. at 283, 410 S.E.2d at 785.

357. Id.

358. Id.
359. Id., 410 S.E.2d at 785-86.
360. Id., 410 S.E.2d at 786.
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Statutory Employer

The decision in Franks v. Avila 61 discusses the extent to which a statutory employer is responsible for the direct payment of benefits and penalties to an injured worker of a subcontractor. In Franks the claimant fell
and injured his neck while working for a subcontractor at a construction
project for which Franks-was the general contractor. The claimant's immediate employer had no workers' compensation coverage, and therefore,
the Board found Franks liable for the payment of workers' compensation
benefits as a statutory employer pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 34-9-8(a).
In addition, however, the Board also assessed Franks a ten percent penalty for willfully neglecting to provide workers' compensation coverage.
Franks appealed, contending first that no workers' compensation benefits
could be collected from him until the claimant had first established his
immediate employer's insolvency through a judgment against 'him for
benefits and for obtaining a fi.fa. on 'which a nulla bona had been entered.
Second, Franks contended that the Board could not assess a penalty for
62
failure to provide insurance.
The court of appeals rejected Franks' first argument, noting that nothing within O.C.G.A. section 34-9-8(a) requires the claimant to obtain a
judgment in superior court against his or her immediate employer." 3 Citing an earlier decision, the court reaffirmed that:
"The purpose of [O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8] is to ensure that employees in construction and other industries are covered by workers' compensation. In
order to do so, it places an increased burden, in the form of potential
liability for workers' compensation benefits, on the statutory employer.
This encourages the statutory employer to require subcontractors to
3 64
carry workers' compensation insurance.
Although the claimant must establish that his immediate employer does
not have workers' compensation coverage, the court found that the claimant satisfied this requirement because of the immediate employer's admission that it. had not secured workers' compensation insurance. 3 s The
court held that requiring the claimant to go further, and actually obtain a
judgment against his immediate employer, was beyond both the requirements of the statute and the remedial purposes of the Act.'"
361. 200 Ga. App. 733, 409 S.E.2d 564 (1991).
362. Id. at 733-34, 409 S.E.2d at 565-66.
363. Id. at 734, 409 S.E.2d at 566.
364. Id. at 733, 409 S.E.2d at 566 (quoting Wright Assocs. v. Rieder, 247 Ga. 496, 499500, 277 S.E.2d 41, 44 (1981)) (brackets in original).
365. Id. at 734, 409 S.E.2d at 566.
366. Id.
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The court reversed, however, with regard to the ten percent penalty. 67
Acknowledging the humane and beneficent purposes of the Act, the court
found that there was no suggestion in the record that Franks had either
"refused or willfully neglected to maintain insurance."'8

8

The court,

therefore, held that without such a finding, the statutory employer could
not be rendered vicariously liable for the acts of the immediate
employer. 6 '
0.

Statute of Limitations

Two cases during the survey period concerned the all-issues statute of
limitations in O.C.G.A. section 34-9-82. Both cases help to clarify when
the statute bars a claim only for medical benefits. In Wier v. Skyline
Messenger Service,370 the claimant, a courier for Skyline, injured her
right knee on June 30, 1988, when she jumped from a loading dock. She
lost no time from work as a result of the injury, and she made no claim
for income benefits, but she did receive medical treatment from an orthopedic specialist who diagnosed a possible torn cartilage and prescribed
exercise at home to strengthen the leg. The claimant aggressively pursued
her exercise program, but in November 1989, her knee gave way at home,
causing her to return to the authorized treating physician. Since more
than one year had passed since the last date of treatment, the employer
denied further liability based upon the one year statute of limitations in
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-82.111 O.C.G.A. section 34-9-82(a) provides that:
The right to compensation shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed
within one year after injury, except that if payment of weekly benefits
has been made or remedial treatment has been furnished by the employer on account of the injury the claim may be filed within one year
after the date of the last remedial treatment furnished by the employer
or within two years after the date of the last payment of weekly
benefits.

'7

The evidence established that the claimant did not visit the doctor from
July 26, 1988, until December 1, 1989. The claimant attempted to avoid
the statute of limitations on two grounds. 8 First, she contended that the
one year statute of limitations does not apply to "medical-only" claims,
based upon the court's previous decision in General Insurance Co. v.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.

Id.
203 Ga. App. 673, 417 S.E.2d 693 (1992).
Id. at 674, 417 S.E.2d at 694-95.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-82(a) (1992).
203 Ga. App. at 675, 417 S.E.2d at 695.
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5

Bradley.s 4 As the court properly noted, however, the decision in Bradley
concerned an entirely different statute of limitations, namely the "change
in condition" statute of limitations in O.C.G.A. section 34-9-104. s 7s The
change in condition statute applies only to cases in which income benefits
have been paid.37 Whether the statute of limitations applies to medical
benefits, therefore, depends upon whether any income benefits have been
paid. If so, then the "change in condition" statute applies, and no statute
of limitations as to medical benefits exists. If, however, the employer has
not paid income benefits, and the case is only a "medical-only" claim,
then the one year statute of limitations found in O.C.G.A. section 34-9-82
3
is still applicable. 77
Wier's second argument was that her physical therapy at home constituted ongoing remedial treatment furnished by the employer, such that
the statute did not begin to run until one year after her physical therapy,
which went on long after the last date the employer actually paid for her
medical treatment. The court also rejected this argument, finding that at
home physical therapy did not constitute "remedial treatment" as defined by O.C.G.A. section 34-9-200(a), and therefore, the statute began to
run on the last date the claimant saw her authorized treating physician.3 78
Therefore, the statute of limitations barred Wier's claim for additional
medical and indemnity benefits.3 79
The court of appeals also discussed the all-issues statute of limitations
in American International Adjusting Co. v. Davis.3 8 0 The court determined that the occupational disease statute of limitations, found in
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-281(b)(2), controlled the decision., ' A physician diagnosed Davis on September 9, 1988, as having work-related pneumoconiosis as a result of his exposure to kaolin dust at work. Other physicians
subsequently confirmed this diagnosis in separate examinations on October 17, 1988, and November 3, 1988. The claimant applied for, and received, full group disability and medical benefits through the employer.
He also retained an attorney on October 27, 1988, for assistance in making a workers' compensation claim. Claimant's counsel requested medical
records from the employer on December 3, 1988, a day after the employer
filed a first report of injury and notice to controvert payment of compensation with the Board. The claimant retained new counsel in October,

374. 152 Ga. App. 600, 263 S.E.2d 446 (1979).
375. 203 Ga. App. at 675, 417 S.E.2d at 695.
376. Clarke v. Samson Mfg. Co., 177 Ga. App. 149, 338 S.E.2d 738 (1985).
377. 203 Ga. App. at 676, 417 S.E.2d at 696.
378. Id. at 675, 417 S.E.2d at 695.
379. Id.
380. *202 Ga. App. 276, 414 S.E.2d 292 (1991).
381. Id. at 277, 414 S.E.2d at 294.
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1989, and claimant's second attorney filed a claim for benefits on October
4, 1989.82

The Board concluded that the occupational disease statute of limitations barred the claim, but on appeal the superior court reversed, finding
that the all-issues statute of limitations in O.C.G.A. section 34-9-82(a)
was applicable, and that the medical treatment paid for by the group insurance carrier constituted medical treatment furnished by the employer
so as to toll the statute of limitations. 33 The court of appeals reversed the
84
superior court, and reinstated the Board's denial of the claim.
The court of appeals first noted that: the Board properly applied the
occupational disease statute of limitations, since the claimant's condition
was clearly an occupational disease as defined by O.C.G.A. section 34-9280(2). s" The statute of limitations for an occupational disease provides
that a claim in such a case must be filed within one year after the date
"the employee knew or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should
have known of the disablement and its relationship to the employment."38 The record established, through the claimant's own testimony,
that he knew of his condition and its work-related cause on September 9,
1988, but did not file a claim until over a year later. These facts barred
3
the claim under the occupational disease statute of limitations. 8
The court went to great lengths, however, to show that even if the allissues statute applied, it also would bar the claim.38 8 The court took the
opportunity to point out that an employer's processing of a claim for
group disability and medical benefits does not necessarily make such
treatment remedial treatment under the Act that would toll the statute of
limitations89 The court specifically found that the group disability benefits paid to the claimant were not "weekly benefits . . . on account of
injury," 3 0 another means of tolling the statute of limitations.3 1 The court
thereby distinguished the case from another recent and controversial decision in which the court of appeals found that the salary paid by an
employer had operated to toll the statute of limitations. 2
The court- noted that even if the court held that the employer should
have provided the medical treatment, the treatment claimant received in
382.
383.
384.'
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.

Id. at 276-77, 414 S.E.2d at 293.
Id. at 277, 414 S.E.2d at 291.
Id. at 280, 414 S.E.2d at 295.
Id. at 277, 414 S.E.2d at 293.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-281(b)(2) (1992) (emphasis added).
202 Ga. App. at 278, 414 S.E.2d at 294.
Id. at 278-79, 414 S.E.2d at 294-95.
Id., 414 S.E.2d at 294.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-82(a) (1992).
202 Ga. App. at 279, 414 S.E.2d at 294.
See Harper v. L & M Granite Co., 197 Ga. App. 157, 397 S.E.2d 739 (1990).

1992]

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

1988 was diagnostic rather than remedial 93 In other words, the medical
treatment received by the claimant was merely to identify his condition,
not to effect a cure or give relief. Since the 'treatment was not remedial, it
could not operate to toll the statute of limitations. This ruling is significant because it will allow employers to provide initial diagnostic treatment without fear of tolling the statute of limitations.
The court also stated that the employer's actions in processing the
claimant's group disability claim did not induce the claimant to avoid filing a workers' compensation claim.3 4 The court noted that the claimant
retained counsel early on in the case for the express purpose of pursuing
the workers' compensation claim, and also noted the lack of any evidence
in the case demonstrating that the actions of the employer could reasonably be interpreted as misleading the claimant into hot filing a claim for
compensation benefits.3 Although the court's discussion of the all-issues
statute in Davis is dicta, since the court applied the occupational disease
statute of limitations, the court's review of the various loopholes argued
by the claimant is instructive for use in future cases.
P.

Subsequent Injury Trust Fund

Although the court of appeals historically has decided very few Subsequent Injury Trust Fund ("SITF") cases, it has issued three such decisions within the last year. The first, Brockway Standard v.Harper,3
clarified a fundamental concept in the definition of "merger." The employer attempted to establish merger under O.C.G.A. section 34-9351(1)(B), which states that merger exists when "the disability resulting
from the subsequent injury in conjunction with the pre-existing permanent impairment is materially, substantially, and cumulatively greater
than that which would have resulted had the pre-existing permanent impairment not been present. 3 97 The ALJ denied reimbursement, however,
on the grounds that the -employer failed t establish merger under
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-351(1)(A), which requires a finding that the subsequent injury would not have occurred if the pre-existing injury had not
been present. On appeal, the full Board affirmed the ALJ decision, and
further held that, in order to prove merger, the employer must meet the
39
requirements of both subsections (A) and (B).

393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.

202 Ga. App. at 279, 414 S.E.2d at 294.
Id. at 280, 414 S.E.2d at 295.
Id.
200 Ga. App. 250, 407 S.E.2d 475 (1991).
Id. at 250, 407 S.E.2d at 477.
Id.
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The court of appeals reversed .38 The court noted that the phrasing of
the statute clearly demonstrates that the two definitions of merger are
separate, distinct, and do not "require the satisfaction of any combination
of the provisions." 00 An employer may, therefore, establish merger solely
by demonstrating that the cumulative effect of the pre-existing impairment and the subsequent injury was materially and substantially greater,
and need
not demonstrate the causal relationship required by subsection
1
(A).'

0

Georgia Subsequent Injury Trust Fund v. Lumley Drywall*0 2
presented the interesting question of whether a sole proprietor who elects
coverage for workers' compensation qualifies -as an employer entitled to
reimbursement from SITF. Lumley, sole proprietor of Lumley Drywall,
elected to be included as an employee for workers' compensation purposes pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 34-9-2.2. When he subsequently injured himself on the job, Lumley filed a claim against SITF based upon
his own personal knowledge of his pre-existing back injury.'0 Lumley
was, therefore, both employee and employer in the claim against SITF
and the sole basis of employer knowledge of the pre-existing impairment.
The SITF rejected the claim for reimbursement, arguing that employer
knowledge cannot be satisfied by a sole proprietor who has hired himself
as an employee. The Board disagreed, however, and the court of appeals
affirmed.

40

'

The court of appeals held that:

to argue that it is illogical for persons to conclude that they are disabled
and to then go into business for themselves begs the question and ignores
the problems that disabled persons have in finding suitable employment

....We should not discourage self-employment and employment of the
handicapped by barring reimbursement from the Fund on the basis of
technical distinctions not found in the Act. Instead of encouraging employment, the Fund would seek to create a class of employers who must
bear the increased cost of pre-existing conditions
even though they are
0
required by law to contribute to the Fund. 5
The court, therefore, held that sole proprietors, who have hired themselves with knowledge of a pre-existing impairment, can satisfy the employer knowledge requirement for reimbursement from SITF.'0°
399. Id. at 251, 407 S.E.2d at 477.
400. Id.

401. Id.
402. 200 Ga. App. 703, 409 S.E.2d 254 (1991).
403. Id. at 704, 409 S.E.2d at 255.'
404. Id.at 704-06, 409 S.E.2d at 255-56.

405. Id. at 705, 409 S.E.2d at 256.
406. Id., 409 S.E.2d at 255.
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JPS Carpets v. Troupe"07 provides an example of insufficient evidence
of merger. Troupe injured her right knee at work in 1981, and received
workers' compensation benefits for a brief time, and ultimately received a
fifteen percent permanent partial disability to her right lower extremity.
She returned to her regular job, but occasionally experienced pain and
swelling in her knee. Troupe injured herself again in 1987 when she
tripped and fell, injuring her right side, right arm, and shoulder. She did
not regain the use of her right arm, and was unable to resume her employment. She received a five percent permanent partial disability rating
to her upper extremity for the subsequent injury in 1987. The employer
requested reimbursement from SITF, but the Board rejected the claim on
the 1981
the basis that the employer had not established merger between
0
pre-existing impairment and the 1987 subsequent injury.4 1
At the ALJ hearing, Troupe testified that the 1987 accident happened
when she caught her left knee in a hole in the pavement, causing all of
her weight to shift to her injured right .leg, which buckled at the knee
because it could not support the weight. An accident report completed by
the employer within twenty-four hours of the injury, however, contained
no mention of Troupe's knee buckling, nor did any of the medical records
of the claimant's treatment for this injury. Notwithstanding Troupe's testimony regarding her injury, the ALJ found that the pre-existing permanent impairment did not cause the 1987 accident, and further concluded
that the claimant's degree of disability was not materially, cumulatively,
or substantially greater because of the pre-existing knee impairment. The
ALJ and the full Board concluded that the claimant's disability was the
result of her 1987 right arm problems, and was no greater because of the
pre-existing knee injury. 9
The court of appeals treated this as an "any evidence" 410 case, finding
the lack of information in the accident report and medical records sufficient evidence for the Board to conclude that no causal connection existed between the pre-existing impairment and the subsequent injury. 1 1
The court also found the evidence sufficient to substantiate the Board's
conclusion that the claimant's disability1 was not substantially greater because of her pre-existing impairment.4 1
407. 203 Ga. App. 602, 417 S.E.2d 333 (1992).
408. Id. at 602-03, 417 S.E.2d at 333-34.
409. Id.
410. On appeal, findings by the Board are conclusive if supported by "any evidence."
Howard Sheppard, Inc. v. McGowan, 137 Ga. App. 408, 224 S.E.2d 65 (1976).

411. 203 Ga. App. at 604, 417 S.E.2d at 334-35.
412. Id., 417 S.E.2d at 335.
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CONCLUSION

Over past years, much discussion has ensued concerning ways to
streamline litigation. In the area of workers' compensation, the discussion
concerns how to save costs for employers/insurers and at the same time
provide sufficient benefits to the employees. This was certainly one of the
many goals of the 1992 legislatiye changes. Taking into consideration the
breadth of those changes, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, the
upcoming survey period should produce some interesting decisions.
Whether we will actually see less litigation, more savings to the employers/insurers, and more benefits to the employees, however, remains to be
seen.

